

# SGG WORKING PAPERS

## Exploring the Impacts of Conflicts Abroad on Diaspora Communities in Canada

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for Public Safety Canada



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## **ABOUT THE PROJECT**

This paper is the result of a year-long research project conducted in 2015 and 2016 with support from Public Safety Canada, titled “Research into Domestic Impacts of Current Conflicts Abroad and Their Implications”. The project aimed to assess the extent to which current and recent conflicts in countries and regions abroad affect related ethnic and religious communities within Canada. The varied responses of these diaspora communities was analyzed, with a specific focus on the risks of radicalization and the demonstration of resilient forms of behaviour.

It is hoped that by gaining a more detailed and textured picture of how various Canadian diaspora communities engage with their ethnic compatriots and co-religionists abroad, particularly in environments of conflict or profound political instability, this project can inform and assist Canadian government and civil society engagement of those communities.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Homegrown terrorism is widely regarded as one of the premier security threats to Canada and other Western countries. While the actual number of terrorist attacks, particularly in North America, remains very small, the threat has been treated in many quarters as almost existential. This seeming overreaction can be attributed to the evolving nature of terrorism in the West, particularly Islamist terrorism, which has been fuelled by domestic radicalized youth rather than foreign extremists. This growing fear of the perceived enemy within has driven populist movements in many countries, which threaten to undercut democratic values, and have caused some to see Muslim diaspora communities as a threat. This trend has also spurred new scholarship and analysis seeking to understand why a small minority of citizens and residents of Western countries, including Canada, are drawn to extremist ideology and violence. This study not only seeks to answer the question of why some Canadian youth have fallen prey to radicalization, but also why Canadian diaspora communities has been so resilient and resistant to this phenomenon.

One discourse on the drivers of homegrown terrorism holds that it is events in conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria and Sri Lanka—and the grievances they generate within certain communities in Canada—that have created a pathway to radicalization. This idea has fostered assumptions in Canada that certain ethnic and religious communities may be particularly vulnerable to influences generated by overseas conflict dynamics. There has been only modest empirical research undertaken in Canada to test this assumption. By studying the varied responses of several ethnic and religious communities in Canada to conflicts abroad, this study seeks to challenge some of the core assumptions that have informed efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE) in Canada and other countries.

Through grassroots research in affected—and often stigmatized—diaspora communities in Canada, and consultations with law enforcement and security agencies, this study found that contrary to being a threat, diaspora communities represent Canada's greatest asset in combatting violent extremism. While the phenomenon of radicalization is a concern within these communities, driven in part by instances of social isolation of individuals or groups, the reservoirs of social capital that exist within the communities make them remarkably resilient to its effects. The study showed that strengthening this social capital rather than expanding coercive security-oriented initiatives represents the most promising and cost-effective means to counter the threat of radicalization. Such efforts must be grounded in an expanded partnership between affected communities and Canadian government and law enforcement agencies. This inclusive, bridge-building approach to CVE will present an effective counterweight to the exclusionary, security-centric model being advocated in some quarters, which has the potential to seriously exacerbate rather than contain the threat.

**ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>APPC</b>	Area Policing Partnership Committees
<b>CSIS</b>	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
<b>CPRLV</b>	Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence
<b>CVE</b>	countering violent extremism
<b>GTA</b>	Greater Toronto Area
<b>HRTs</b>	high-risk travellers
<b>INSET</b>	Integrated National Security Enforcement Team
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
<b>JPs</b>	Junior Police Academies
<b>LTTE</b>	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PTSD</b>	post-traumatic stress disorder
<b>PQ</b>	Parti Québécois
<b>RCMP</b>	Royal Canadian Mounted Police

## INTRODUCTION

In 2006, the RAND Corporation, in cooperation with the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, convened a conference on “Radicalization, Terrorism and Diasporas” that brought together analysts and researchers from seven countries with expertise in diaspora and migrant communities. The conference proceedings resulting from the event described the threat that diaspora communities present to host countries, particularly in the West: “Diaspora communities are not only supporting terrorist attacks targeting western countries; they are directly participating in them through recruitment, fundraising, training, operations, and procurement” (Hoffman et al. 2007, vii). The report went on to affirm: “we are witnessing a new phenomenon of Diaspora communities turning against their adopted homelands, targeting the government and its people” (ibid., 1). Speaking specifically of Canada, one of the conference’s case studies, the proceedings explained how “Canada has a history of being a base or locale for many major organizations involved in homeland conflicts” and how “tensions are growing” due to the failure of many immigrants to integrate into Canadian society (ibid., xi). Canadian journalist Stewart Bell, in his book *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Supports Terrorism Around the World*, notes how Canada faces “unique troubles” in countering violent extremism “because of the nature of its society” and “its immigration system” (Bell 2007, 6). In the preface to Bell’s book, terrorism specialist Ronan Gunaratna recognized that members of Canadian diaspora communities, albeit “a tiny minority,” were “driven by events in their homeland...to support and participate in violence in their homelands and even in their host country—Canada” (ibid., xii). Bell and Gunaratna follow in the footsteps of a long line of terrorism specialists who tend to characterize the very presence of diaspora communities as a threat to their host country. The problem with diasporas, according to this discourse, is their failure to adequately integrate into mainstream society.

This notion of the diaspora as a threat—as an incubator for terrorism and a driver of radicalization—has gained traction in the years following the RAND conference, particularly with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is rooted to the idea that multiculturalism has failed and that better integration of diaspora groups into host societies is required to contain the threat they pose. There are two primary problems with the diaspora as a threat thesis: First, there is little evidence in Canada or beyond to support the idea, as Rahimi and Graumans argue, “that a lack of cultural integration equals an increased threat of radicalization.” Despite the paucity of evidence, this “assumption that less integration leads to more radicalization is clearly expressed across a broad range of media sources, academic literature, and official state policies” (Rahimi and Graumans 2015, 29). Second, the thesis ignores the role that resilient diaspora communities can play, and

have played, in resisting radicalization and violent extremism in Canada and beyond.

There is little question that “homegrown” extremism and radicalization represent one of the pre-eminent threats to Canadian security, as evidenced by the 180 Canadians believed to have travelled abroad to engage in “threat related activities” in recent years (CSIS 2016). Although Canada has featured fewer foreign fighters per capita than 11 European countries (including Belgium, Sweden, France, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom) (Shiel 2015),<sup>1</sup> even with 20 percent of its population foreign born (the highest percentage in the Group of Eight) (Statistics Canada 2011), the growth of radicalization has been alarming. And certain ethnic, religious and national communities have been particularly affected by radicalization and extremist behaviour. However, there is still insufficient evidence to suggest that political or social dynamics within Canada’s diaspora communities, and its multicultural system more broadly, make them enablers of radicalization. In fact, attempts “to explain or understand radicalization as a consequence of simple causes and direct pathways,” as Rahimi and Graumans (2015, 48-49) show, can be “dangerous,” as “it can lead to ineffective, or worse, counterproductive interventions that may damage inter-communal trust and push certain groups to their limits of resilience.”

A 2014 study from the Mosaic Institute effectively dispelled the commonly held belief that inter-group conflicts persist after the populations have relocated to Canada (Mosaic Institute 2014). This study will build on that work with a specific focus on diaspora communities’ vulnerability to radicalization in response to images and influences of conflicts abroad. The diaspora as a threat thesis assumes that certain ethnic and religious diaspora communities may be acutely vulnerable to influences generated by conflict dynamics emanating from their ethnic and religious homelands. There has been only modest empirical research undertaken in Canada to test these assumptions. This study explores the varied responses to conflicts abroad in four case study communities in Canada: the Afghan, Somali, Syrian and Tamil communities. The research had two objectives: to assess the extent to which recent and/or current conflicts abroad are having an impact domestically in Canada, particularly in terms of driving forms of radicalization and extremism; and to shed light on how these different communities are responding, both positively and negatively, while highlighting different forms of community resilience.

The selection of the cases was informed by the desire to highlight a range of different overseas conflict influences and dynamics, and to feature diaspora communities with varying socio-economic characteristics. The Afghan conflict is an intrastate conflict that has featured a robust international intervention with a strong Canadian presence. Since 2002, there has been an influx of Afghan refugees, with roughly 23,000 Afghans becoming permanent residents of Canada during that period, primarily settling in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). There are significant ethnic, sectarian and ideological divisions within the Afghan community. Afghan Canadians have been implicated in extremist activity,

including the Toronto 18 plot, which aimed to conduct attacks on high-value Canadian targets such as the Parliament Buildings and the Toronto Stock Exchange.

The conflict in Somalia has taken on many forms in recent decades: it has assumed the character of an intrastate and regional conflict with strong sectarian dimensions. Canada is home to one of the largest diaspora Somali populations in the world, primarily situated in the GTA. The community has experienced high rates of poverty and crime, fostering feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement. Numerous Somali youth have travelled overseas to fight for both the Somali militant group al-Shabaab and, more recently, ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

The Syrian civil war has a strong sectarian character with a pan-Islamic appeal that has involved significant levels of regional and Western intervention. In Canada, the Syrian community tends to be well integrated and widely dispersed geographically, although the demographic picture is changing with the huge influx of new refugees in 2015 and 2016. There have been few public reports of Syrian Canadians becoming involved in extremist activity.

Canada's large Tamil diaspora was linked to an intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka, with ethnic and nationalist dimensions, that ended in 2009. Primarily concentrated in the GTA, the Tamil community has featured high levels of political activism related to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had a significant support base in Canada during the period of the civil war, where it engaged in extensive fundraising activities. The Tamil community has experienced problems with street gangs, but this has receded over time as the community has become more established and affluent.

This diverse set of case study communities, linked to a range of conflict types, provides a good basis with which to assess the role of diaspora communities in the emergence of processes of radicalization. It is also important to note that the communities are at different stages in their trajectories in Canada. The Tamil community is well established, and recently saw the end of the overseas conflict that spawned domestic extremism, while the bulk of the Syrian community is relatively nascent and rapidly growing, with the conflict that drove its current wave of migration still raging. In this light, the communities could offer lessons to each other on how to strengthen community resilience and manage vulnerabilities to extremism.

This study also examines the efforts of Canadian law enforcement to engage diaspora communities, which have picked up momentum in recent years. There is an increasing realization of the need for a robust partnership between the security services and diaspora communities to effectively address the problem of radicalization and extremist violence. Public Safety Canada's *2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada* explained, "the Government works closely with law enforcement partners to prevent violent extremism

by building prevention capacity in local communities” (Public Safety Canada 2015, 4) A December 2015 post on the ministry’s website reaffirmed “a strong and integrated law enforcement approach, in partnership with impacted communities, has been created to counter terrorist criminal activity and radicalization leading to violence. While there is a clear role for law enforcement in countering violent radicalization, it must be undertaken in collaboration with communities and the relevant government agencies” (Public Safety Canada 2016a). Most contemporary studies agree that there are limitations to the effectiveness of a security-centric approach to countering violent extremism (CVE). Counter-narratives against extremism are typically already present in target communities; bolstering those narratives and strengthening broader community resilience is increasingly regarded as a centrepiece of well-constructed CVE strategies. Interviews and consultations with diaspora community members and law enforcement for this study revealed a strong desire for joint action to address the problem of radicalization and terrorism, but also a lingering mutual suspicion. For the communities, this is rooted in perceptions of institutional discrimination and profiling by security services, and for law enforcement, a belief that some communities have not been fully cooperative with anti-terrorism efforts in the past. The continued need for confidence-building between the communities and security agencies is apparent.

A number of crosscutting themes can be detected in the research conducted at the community level that are significant in assessing the vulnerabilities of the communities to radicalization and understanding their points of resilience. Across the cases we saw a number of risk factors that could increase community susceptibility to radicalization, including: intra-community and intergenerational splits that harmed community cohesion; significant levels of youth alienation and disillusionment linked to perceptions of institutional discrimination; suspicions of state security forces; and psychosocial and socio-economic difficulties derived from historical conflict traumas and the “immigrant experience.”

Many of these factors look to be manageable with targeted investments in law enforcement, social services and community engagement. But the research also showed tremendous reservoirs of resilience and social capital in the communities that could be tapped into, as well as evidence of widespread rejection of extremist ideas. The research indicated that it is not the communities *per se* that enable radicalization processes, but rather the self-isolation of vulnerable individuals. Accordingly, more attention should be dedicated to expanding the reach and resources of communities to identify and re-engage isolated youth. This report argues that contrary to some of the existing discourses on terrorism, diaspora populations in Canada should not be framed as a security liability, but as an indispensable asset in CVE strategies. Healthy, robust diaspora communities provide a vital defence against violent extremism. A central pillar of government CVE efforts should focus on building social capital and resilience in these communities, breaking

down barriers between them and the Canadian security establishment.

The report will begin with an explanation of the methodology employed by the project, including definitions of key terms, followed by a review of some of the important literature on diaspora communities and violent extremism. The heart of this report will examine the four case study communities, identifying the major themes of the community-based research. Law enforcement approaches and attitudes toward diaspora groups and CVE will then be analyzed, with reference to recent policy and programmatic innovations. The final section will seek to draw out some of the main crosscutting themes and ideas from the case study analysis with an eye to how it should influence government policy and practice.

## METHODOLOGY

The research that informed this report was anchored in interviews and focus groups in the four case study communities. In total, 28 semi-structured interviews and focus groups with community leaders and youth (aged 18-29) were conducted for this study (5 community leader interviews and 2 focus groups for each case study community). The interviews and focus groups were conducted between September 2015 and January 2016 in a variety of locations across Ontario and Quebec; however, due to the geographical distribution of the communities, the majority were carried out in the GTA. The focus groups primarily featured politically active youth –the grouping most vulnerable to radicalization– while the community leader interviews were not restricted by age and targeted prominent community members from different political and social backgrounds. The research team hired an experienced community convener for each case study community to select the focus group participants and community leaders on the basis of local consultations.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out with various levels of law enforcement – both Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) officers across different divisions and municipal police in Ontario and Quebec, including the National Capital Region. A total of 14 interviews were conducted between September and December 2015 and involved interviews with officers who play a variety of roles in national security and CVE, such as community outreach and engagement, prevention, investigations/operations and enforcement. The questions posed to the officers inquired about their professional experiences dealing, either directly or indirectly, with diaspora communities in Canada, and asked them to characterize the nature of the relationship between their agency/ department and each of the case study communities in the study. Law enforcement

officers were also asked to express their views on a number of topics, including: the impacts of conflicts abroad on diaspora communities; their understanding of the terms “radicalization” and “resilience”; the roles played by community outreach and engagement programs in CVE; the profiles of individuals most “at risk” of radicalization; epicentres of community resilience; and prominent challenges that exist to engaging diaspora communities. They were further asked for their recommendations concerning improvements to programming to counter radicalization and promote community resilience.

All of the research for the paper was reviewed by our multidisciplinary steering committee of project mentors, composed of recognized experts on issues of terrorism, violent extremism, diaspora communities and international conflict.

Three terms that are employed heavily in the report that require definition are radicalization, resilience and social capital. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) defines radicalization “as the process by which individuals—usually young people—are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views.” Radical beliefs among Canadians become problematic from a security perspective, the RCMP notes, when they espouse or lead to “violence or direct action as a means of promoting” them (RCMP 2009, 1). Public Safety Canada’s *2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada* explained that the radicalization process can take place in virtually any space “where like-minded people come together” and can be caused by “mentors, ideologues and other influential relationships” (Public Safety Canada 2015). The process, according to the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) (2016), “can be triggered, influenced or facilitated by sociopolitical or socioemotional circumstances that affect the individual either directly or indirectly.” Notably, the centre recognizes that “no link has been established between violent radicalization and an individual’s characteristics on a socio-economic level (social background or level of wealth), in terms of ethno-cultural background (nationality, faith or religious practice), or from a psychological standpoint.”

According to Longstaff et al. (2010, 3), resilience “refers to the capacity of a community system, or part of that system, to absorb and recover from disruptive events.”<sup>2</sup> Kimhi (2015) breaks down the concept of community resilience in the specific context of the challenge of violent extremism:

Community resilience means more than the sum of its resilient individuals and may be guaranteed only by a strong sense of community. It expresses the interaction between individuals and their community and pertains to the ability of the individual to get help from his/her community and the ability of the community to help individuals and provide for their needs...it reflects personal attitudes, perceptions and feelings toward one’s

community, such as perceived threats, availability of community resources, social cohesion and trust in leadership.

Social capital, a building block of community resilience, is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (Keely 2007, 103). Simply speaking, “social capital provides the glue which facilitates co-operation, exchange and innovation” in communities (ibid., 104). By building “bonds,” “bridges” and “linkages” (ibid., 103) between individuals and sub-groups in communities, community social capital is increased. Communities with strong social capital are, by definition, more resilient.

## THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

This section will summarize dominant trends in the academic and policy literature on the impacts of “homeland” conflicts on diaspora communities in Canada and beyond, notably their role in driving radicalization and extremist violence. A number of sources suggested a direct relationship between conflicts abroad and different political and social dynamics in Canadian diaspora communities. Some scholarship and media accounts have focused on the role that diaspora communities based in Canada have played in driving overseas conflicts, for instance through financing, political support and the recruitment of foreign fighters.<sup>3</sup> Another link between foreign conflicts and Canada is the possibility of “imported conflict,” whereby inter-group conflict in a foreign country is reproduced by diaspora populations in Canada. Most notably, a 2014 study by the Mosaic Institute called into question the commonly held belief that inter-group conflicts persist after the populations have relocated to Canada. The study found that while most Canadians believe that “it is common for tensions within or between communities to continue when people move to Canada from places where they have experienced warfare or conflict,” only a minority of respondents reported being personally engaged in trying to resolve or otherwise change those conflicts abroad or at home (Monahan, Berns-McGown and Morden 2014, 10).

For this research, the most relevant literature describes the extent to which global events have the potential to attract populations to violent extremism.<sup>4</sup> Whine (2009, 8) cited violence in Kashmir and Palestine, the Iraq War and the mass killings of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina as global events that played “a driving force in activating Muslim political engagement and recruitment by Islamist groups.” Others also note the impact of foreign

events on local communities at a general level (Fishman 2010). Bramadat (2011) describes the interplay of the distant world (for instance Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq and Israel/Palestine), which may fuel the perception of a “regularly violated Ummah (or the broadly imagined global Muslim community),” and the proximal world, which may juxtapose the “sense of entitlement and arrogance exhibited by some people living in the first world.” In this model, perceptions of foreign conflict are influenced by domestic experiences and vice versa.

The particular global events that are salient to individual communities vary. Menkhaus (2009, 91) found that “while issues and events in the Middle East have been critical in radicalising Muslim diasporas of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, they may not resonate as much with African Muslim diaspora groups.” Instead, Menkhaus found that African Muslim diaspora groups were “more likely to share grievances related to treatment of Muslims in the West generally post 9/11” (ibid.). Other research similarly focuses more directly on particular communities, discussing the role of specific international events on radicalization. For instance, Weine and Ahmed (2012) studied the large Somali-American community in Minneapolis-St Paul, and found that the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006-2009 played an important role in radicalization in that community. They described it as “a shot that rang out throughout the Somali Diaspora along with an urgent call for action.”

These studies suggest that geopolitical events can be a motivating factor for violent extremists. However, the picture is complicated by research suggesting that the motivations of violent extremists are social as well as political. In one study, Ahmed, Ferguson and Salt (2015, 34) described a range of motivations, including “the impact of globalization; the effect of peer networks; a prevailing sense of humiliation and social isolation; the tendency to express ideological/faith solidarity against injustices globally; the presence of Islamophobia within Canadian society, and unfulfilled social-economic expectations.” Among this mix of social and political factors, the authors noted that family struggles and a lack of positive support were mentioned as the most important motivating factor for terrorism (ibid., 35). Another report noted similar social and political factors, including “identity crisis, personal trauma, discrimination, segregation, and alienation to misinformation about Islam and Western foreign policy,” but argued that other important factors must be present “for radicalization to take hold” (Bizina and Gray 2014, 3). Christmann (2012) described perceptions of marginalization and Western double-standards in foreign policy as playing a role in radicalization, but also a sense of personal empowerment, friendship and social belonging. In an analysis of survey evidence, Leuprecht, Skillicorn and Winn (2012, 951) found that “radicalization is much more a personal issue than one of social, economic, or foreign policy.”

A 2011 RAND Corporation report that examined trends in Islamic radicalization and

terrorism in Europe argued that “the absorption of jihadist ideology by European Muslims is an independent process, taking place individually or, most often, with a small group of friends (Vidino 2011, ix).” The report did recognize that “jihad entrepreneurs,” typically charismatic ideologues who often act as “webmasters of radical websites” or preach and recruit in the local community, play a significant role as “radicalizing agents” (ibid.) These actors present a major challenge for CVE programs as they can blend into host communities and are typically unresponsive to de-radicalization or reintegration messaging and activities. However, the RAND study also emphasized that direct recruitment of individuals in Western countries by overseas terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS is a far less common radicalization pathway than the phenomenon of “self-radicalized individuals or clusters” reaching out to extremist groups to form linkages (ibid., x). In other words, radicalized individuals inspired by the message and actions of extremist groups tend to seek them out to pledge their allegiance rather than vice versa.

Even a cursory overview of the discourse on radicalization shows, as McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 429) argue, that it is “unlikely that any single theory can integrate all the influences that bring individuals to radical political action.” They “suggest that there are multiple and diverse pathways leading individuals and groups to radicalization and terrorism.” What is clear, say McCauley and Moskalenko, is that the process of radicalization tends to be “reactive,” a response to the environment or conditions that radicalized individuals face. According to this logic, widespread Islamophobia, discrimination and inequality can serve as potent drivers of radicalization (ibid., 430). In this light, the election of Donald Trump as US president in 2016 and his subsequent issuance of executive orders banning citizens from seven (and then six) Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States, has created optimal conditions for the radicalization of vulnerable Muslims in the United States. The heated anti-Muslim rhetoric of the Trump election campaign and administration, building on similar messaging of right-wing populists in other Western countries, has fostered a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in the West. The attack on a Quebec City mosque by a right-wing extremist in 2017, killing six people, is an outgrowth of this heated climate and demonstrates that processes of radicalization are not limited to non-state Muslim groups. Growing pressure on Muslim communities in the West, undergirded by a “clash of civilizations” discourse, will only increase the sentiments of marginalization and disenfranchisement that pave the pathway to radicalization. As McCauley and Moskalenko explain, “radicalization emerges in a relationship of intergroup competition and conflict in which both sides are radicalized” (ibid.).

Within this literature on the motivation of violent extremists in Canada and similar countries, there are several important distinctions to be made. First, the relationship between radical ideology and violent action is not straightforward. Research by Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010) identified a key distinction between radicals and terrorists:

while both groups experienced societal exclusion, disconnection with society, distrust of government and anger at Western foreign policy and high levels of distrust of police and intelligence agencies, the radicals in their study “also felt genuine affection for Western values (i.e. tolerance and pluralism, political system, culture) [while] the terrorists showed aversion to western society and values.”

Second, there are limitations to research focused on the experiences of violent extremists. Chiefly, a shortcoming of this kind of research is that while it does show “how radical ideas are internalized by terrorists post facto,” it does not explain why most people who are exposed to radical ideas do not become radicalized (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011). The movement of individuals from merely being frustrated or politically disaffected toward accepting violence is poorly understood, and the question of why some people become radicalized while others in the same circumstances do not, remains a key area of inquiry. From this perspective, the role of family and community is vital in understanding forms of resilience against violent extremism.

The academic and policy literature offers insight into which actors should be involved in countering violent extremism, what models for engagement are most effective and what roles law enforcement can productively take on. Ahmed, Fergusson and Salt (2015, 58) cite five key stakeholders for a community-based collaborative model of terrorism intervention: “the local ethnic and faith-based organizations; academia; local law enforcement agencies; the provincial government’s ministries of labour, immigration, and multiculturalism; and the media.” Bhulai, Fink and Zeiger (2014, 4) stress the importance of “credible community actors,” noting that the police and other government officials were often among the least-trusted members of the community.<sup>5</sup> Other studies have noted problems associated with determining the legitimate representatives of given communities. As a report of the Canadian High Commission (2008, 14) in the United Kingdom noted, “some community leaders are gateways, others are gatekeepers who can foil even the most concerted attempts to reach out to the right people. Meanwhile, reaching out to the wrong people—self-styled leaders and spokesmen who have no real credibility—can exacerbate the very tensions that a comprehensive prevention of radicalization strategy is trying to alleviate.”

Bhulai, Fink and Zeiger (2014, 4) found that women—both mothers and wives—were “powerful preventers” and had the ability to dissuade family members from becoming involved in violence. They also suggested that parents needed to be given the tools to effectively respond to early warning signs of extremism (ibid., 8). Noting that “the need for a social group—and friendship in particular—is critical in regard to the radicalisation process,” Marret, Feddes, Mann and Doosje argue that interventions should focus not only on the individual but also their family, friends and community (ibid., 2). According to one study, a key focus of anti-radicalization interventions should be on replacing the social aspects of extremist group affiliation. The study found that members of extremist groups

tended to have low levels of self-esteem prior to joining the group, higher levels while an active member and low levels once again after leaving (ibid., 3).

What most studies agree on is that there are limitations to the effectiveness of a law enforcement-driven approach to countering violent extremism.<sup>6</sup> The 2008 Canadian High Commission report emphasized that the UK's model of radicalization prevention was not applicable in Canada and in some ways represented what *not* to do “in building a lasting and a healthy response to the phenomenon of radicalization” (Canadian High Commission 2008, 13). In particular, the report noted that the communities targeted by CVE programs are “likely to be highly suspicious of engagement strategies that are linked to a security agenda” (ibid.). Instead, the report suggested that Canada's strategy should be to improve community resilience to radicalization through support and prevention programming.

Bhulai, Fink and Zeiger (2014, 9) discuss the need to generate “local narratives” that reject violence and violent extremism, noting that governments are typically not the most effective promoter for this kind of messaging. Other studies point out that the most effective counter-narratives against extremism are typically already present in target communities. The central role of religion in counter-narratives was referenced by Joose, Bucerius and Thompson (2015, 12), who found that 88 percent of participants in a study of Somali-Canadian attitudes said that religion played a major role in their daily lives. It was religiously based counter-narratives to the messaging of al-Shabaab, rather than secular ones, that resonated most forcefully. In effect, the Somali-Canadian community “has already developed narrative tools that render it largely resistant to the radicalization process” (2015, 4). Parent and Ellis (2011, 7) also affirmed that CVE programs must “address both secular and religious organizations.”

The literature emphasizes that overly security-centric, government-driven CVE programming will be hard-pressed to succeed. Various studies suggest that the communities themselves must play a leading role in preventing violent extremism, for instance by providing credible, convincing counter-narratives to violent extremism. In particular, families, community leaders and religious figures should be included in CVE programming, not just as passive participants but the driving force.

## CASE STUDY COMMUNITIES

The following sections focus on the case study communities' perspectives on the domestic impacts of conflicts abroad and the influence of broader societal factors on radicalization. They also highlight existing forms of social capital and community-led counter-radicalization initiatives that are believed to strengthen community resilience.

### The Afghan Diaspora

The Afghan community in Canada was described by research participants as representing a microcosm of Afghan society.<sup>7</sup> The dynamics of the conflict have been “exported” from “homeland” to “host-land.” This has been reflected in inter-ethnic and tribal divisions that continue to hinder the Afghan diaspora and have had a negative impact on the community’s ability to foster resilience. Youth disillusionment and alienation also featured prominently as factors impeding community cohesion. In part, this relates to intergenerational splits and traditional cultural and gendered practices within the community. These prevent youth from taking on leadership roles and addressing issues they feel are important for the diaspora and Afghanistan. Youth disillusionment was also framed as a response to external influences such as the politically charged landscape created by the “war on terror.” Youth research participants explained that they feel there are limited opportunities for them to engage politically or articulate alternative views to those espoused by Western governments and the media without accusations of being a terrorist, Taliban sympathizer or anti-Western. This sentiment is related to perceptions of broader Islamophobia in Canadian society and has resulted in some youth turning to social media to express themselves.

Many research participants acknowledged that there are radicalization risks in the community. Although these were described as relatively low-level risks, they are believed to originate from powerful, non-secular individuals who hold leadership positions in certain mosques and Islamic schools throughout the community. It is, according to several research participants, potentially dangerous to speak up against these voices on contentious issues in the community, such as women’s rights, or to support secular, Western practices that might contravene the teachings of these actors.

Some Afghan research participants identified the pluralism and tolerance promoted by Canada’s brand of multiculturalism as creating, in some circumstances, a permissive environment for radicalization. Features of multiculturalism, they explained, can inadvertently permit the self-isolation of diaspora communities if little integration into broader Canadian society is achieved. This can enable the continuation of potentially

harmful traditional or conservative practices in diaspora communities, which can facilitate the adoption of radical views and/or behaviours.

### **Demographic Snapshot: The Afghan-Canadian Community**

There have been three primary waves of Afghan immigration to Canada: the first after the 1979 Soviet invasion; the second during the 1991-1996 civil war; and the third after the 9/11 attacks and the international intervention to oust the Taliban (Taylor 2009). According to the 2011 census,<sup>8</sup> the total number of Afghans in Canada is 62,815 (31,640 male and 31,175 female). Almost half of the Afghan-Canadian population live in Toronto (49.7%), with other large population centres in Montreal (11.7%), Vancouver (8.1 %) and Calgary (6.1%). The average age of the Afghan-Canadian population is 27.3 years, younger than the overall average of the Canadian population (39.1 years). Roughly 51% of the population are under the age of 25 and 68% are under the age of 45 (versus 57% for all Canadians). The median income for the community was \$16,570 in 2010, significantly lower than the \$29,878 for the country as a whole.

There have been some recent reports of radicalization and extremist attitudes in the Afghan community, the most notorious of which was Fagim Ahmad, the ringleader of the Toronto 18 group, which planned to launch a series of high-profile terrorist attacks on Canadian soil. In 2014, Afghan-Canadian Hasibullah Yusufzai, from Burnaby, BC, travelled to Syria to join ISIS (Bell 2014). He was the first Canadian to be charged under a new section of the Criminal Code covering terror-related travel (CBC News 2014a).

The Afghan community faces a number of internal problems, including youth gangs and poverty. Two Afghan gangs in Toronto, Afghan for Life and Afghan Fighting Generation, are reported to be involved in drugs and weapons trafficking (Bell 2013a).

### *Inter-ethnic and tribal divisions within the diaspora*

Inter-communal divides along several “fault-lines” in the Afghan diaspora—ethnic, religious, conservative/westernized—and especially across different ethnic and tribal

groups, continue to hinder community resilience. These ethnic cleavages have been directly “imported” from the Afghan conflict, much as Afghan religious and cultural practices have been introduced into Canada by the arrival of Afghan immigrants and refugees beginning in the 1980s and accelerating in the late 1990s and 2000s.<sup>9</sup> Internal divisions inhibit community activism and have played a part in preventing the establishment of a coherent Afghan diaspora response to the conflict and events taking place in the “homeland.” This was depicted as a more significant factor in impeding community cohesion among older generations than for Afghan youth, where it was thought that openings for greater inter-ethnic collaboration might be feasible.<sup>10</sup>

Community resilience has also been negatively impacted by segregation in mosques and other important cultural spaces that could otherwise facilitate a greater sense of community cohesion. In addition to ethnic polarization, this segregation was linked to divisions within the community along secular and non-secular lines. Some research participants noted that community members who adopt “Western” or secular practices have been ostracized by non-secular actors in the diaspora.<sup>11</sup> This has also resulted in the self-exclusion of “Western” Afghans from the community and a loss of diversity, which can enable the continuation of harmful traditional practices and/or the spread of radical views without voices in the community to challenge them.

### *Youth alienation and disillusionment—the politicization of activism*

Afghan youth expressed frustration over the responses in Canada toward their activism and forms of expression. For instance, members of the anti-war movement were shocked to see their activities framed as “radical.”<sup>12</sup> Youth activists believe they have been targeted by the Canadian government as potentially pro-Taliban for espousing views that go against the dominant narratives of the Canadian government and media regarding the war on terror. The misrepresentation and stigmatization of group activism and political expression can result in a loss of community resilience. This phenomenon was lamented by a community leader who asserted that the decline in Afghan community organizations is linked to anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic rhetoric.<sup>13</sup> There is a risk that the politicization of activism could lead youth to look elsewhere for belonging and acceptance. This could potentially drive them toward more extremist organizations or individuals.

Although the potential for radicalization and violence in the community was acknowledged, the frustrations experienced by youth research participants appear to have had the opposite result in regard to their activism. They reported that rather than participating in violence, they had engaged in non-violent activism and/or turned to social media as outlets to articulate their views. For example, one focus group member remarked “we have so many different platforms and outlets where we can express how we feel,

whether it be through social media, whether it be through student groups, whether it be through cultural groups, whether it be through activist groups, or even just writing about it.”<sup>14</sup>

### *The impact of social media on youth attitudes and community cohesion*

Social media platforms play two principal roles in shaping attitudes and community cohesion in the Afghan community: (1) influencing the opinions and perspectives of youth, and (2) acting as an outlet that enables youth to express themselves and their views in a perceived “safe” space. The role of social media in radicalization and resilience represent something of a “double-edged” sword. It remains unclear whether social media platforms overall contribute more positively or negatively to community resilience.

On the one hand, concerns were expressed over what youth might be exposed to online as anyone can post content to social media platforms. Even if this content is factually inaccurate, it can play a role in shaping the views of, and encouraging certain actions among, impressionable youth. According to one community leader, “the youth are heavily influenced by social media. The social media is unevenly biased in one direction and you can see it in the chatter on when you go on.”<sup>15</sup> From this perspective, social media can impact radicalization in the Afghan diaspora by specifically targeting youth with extremist messaging that is intended to incite feelings of anger and/or injustice.

On the other hand, Afghan youth stated that social media provides an outlet for them to express their frustrations over events taking place in Afghanistan and the related policies adopted toward their homeland by the Canadian government. Social media platforms such as Facebook provide a perceived “safe” environment in which to post thoughts and discuss views with friends and online networks. According to this view, social media can strengthen community resilience through the networks of support it provides for youth who may be targeted by Islamophobic or racist messaging. This includes those who might require a space in which to openly discuss their feelings and air grievances in a healthy and non-violent manner without being accused of being an “extremist” or “radical.”<sup>16</sup> The utility of social media was also described as providing a platform in which to educate the wider public and to counter anti-Muslim views propagated on the Internet.<sup>17</sup>

### *Intergenerational splits and identity issues*

Intergenerational divides between older and younger Afghan Canadians were raised by a number of research participants. These divides pose a myriad of challenges for the community regarding (1) disagreements over appropriate gendered and cultural practices and activism, and (2) a perceived lack of support for youth seeking to take on leadership roles in the community. Issues surrounding appropriate gendered and cultural practices were viewed by youth as tools for older generations to prevent them from engaging in activism and/or acting in ways that are looked upon as inappropriate by older generations. This was explicitly addressed in the comments of a female focus group participant regarding the resistance she has faced over her political activities. Interestingly, this resistance was not a result of her stated cause or objective, but rather motivated by the way she dresses and the nature of her interactions with non-Afghan men through her activism.<sup>18</sup>

Another Afghan youth illuminated the challenges in being accepted by the established leadership in the community: “You have to be traditional to an extent. You can’t be too Western...You’re not supposed to be super religious, but you can’t not be religious either. You have to know your languages. There are many barriers for youth...to politically engaging their Afghan identity here in Toronto.”<sup>19</sup> The impression persists that older generations are not providing space for youth to adopt leadership positions in the community. This could have the long-term effect of “crowding out” the next generation Afghan leaders, with resultant “gaps” in community resilience.<sup>20</sup>

Despite these intergenerational divides, youth were identified as an important source of community resilience. Youth can inject new ideas and forms of creativity into the community. They also understand the many challenges faced by other youth in their community. This is apparent in the comments of an Afghan research participant on the rationale behind the founding of a youth sports association to combat the threat of street gangs. The individual explained: “that’s one of the reasons why I started the association, because lots of Afghans were really talented players in different sports. Since we started that, lots of these gangs became basketball players, soccer players, and played different sports. The sports kind of changed them.”<sup>21</sup>

### *Linkages between multiculturalism and radicalization*

According to some community participants, multiculturalism can inadvertently permit the self-isolation of diaspora communities and the continuation of potentially harmful traditional or conservative practices that can create an enabling environment for radicalization. A community leader explained: “we know that there are forces that Afghan youth could be influenced [by] in certain mosques and Islamic schools.”<sup>22</sup> This can be

attributed, the leader went on to explain, to a Canadian multicultural system that does not push immigrants to integrate into mainstream Canadian. Paradoxically, multiculturalism can permit newer migrants to isolate themselves and be cut off from broader Canadian society because there is an already established “homeland” community that they can easily blend into. According to one community leader, “I’m for multiculturalism and all of that, but on the other hand this is something that doesn’t allow a lot of integration. When you come to a family that are going to the mosque and they stay within themselves, and just carry on their rituals, they bring little Afghanistan or little Kabul here.”<sup>23</sup>

Concerns were also expressed over the fact that certain mosques and community organizations are more conservative and potentially radical than others. Research participants described how some religious and community leaders are thought to espouse radical views and beliefs. There was also some discussion of the existence of an underlying fear that permeates the community related to the “dangers” associated with espousing views that contravene the beliefs of these individuals.<sup>24</sup> Although few could provide evidence of the specific sources of this fear, those responsible were broadly described as non-secular, conservative voices that possess power and influence in the community.<sup>25</sup> It was unclear whether the research participants that alluded to this fear knew the individuals and/or groups that were responsible or whether it is indicative of a generalized perception that exists across the community. The relatively low turnout of Afghans at demonstrations and marches covering more contentious issues, such as women’s rights, was attributed to the power of these individuals.<sup>26</sup>

Finally, several research participants alluded to concerns regarding anti-Muslim sentiments in Canadian society. These comments arose in relation to the controversy surrounding the right of Muslim women to wear the niqab during Canadian citizenship ceremonies, (The Canadian Press 2015),<sup>27</sup> which was a major issue in the 2015 federal election that preceded this study.<sup>28</sup> Rather than representing a concern specific to the Afghan community, however, this was framed as alarming for Muslims across Canada. The potential for politicized issues such as the niqab controversy to incite anger among an already disenfranchised and frustrated Muslim youth in the future should not be overlooked. Moreover, taking account of Islamophobia in building an understanding of the interconnections between various forms of radicalization and community resilience is important.

### **The Somali Diaspora**

Conducting research on the Somali diaspora community in Canada can be quite challenging. Many in the community feel that they are “overstudied” and scrutinized. They point to an inverse relationship between the amount of studies that take place and

the resources provided to address issues in the community. The research participants interviewed for this project were uneasy about the overwhelming attention given to radicalization, while other issues that are perceived to be more pressing go unaddressed. It is not the case that members of the community are against discussing their challenges, rather that they raised questions regarding the “targeting” of the Somali community as a “hotbed” for radicalization. Research participants were generally forthcoming about the significant levels of disenfranchisement and alienation they were struggling with: high school dropouts, drugs and gangs, racism, poverty, and even the growing spectre of sex work among young Somali women. While some of these issues were discussed in the context of the “immigrant experience” in Canada, many of the youth were cognizant of the fact that they are also rooted in the community’s history as a refugee diaspora. Older generations often suffer from some form of conflict-related trauma, while youth wrestle with competing identities as Muslim, Canadian, African and black.

Of the case study communities that participated in this research, the Somali community expressed the highest levels of mistrust toward the Canadian government and law enforcement/security sector actors. This animosity was often linked directly to community perceptions of discrimination, particularly on the part of Canadian law enforcement officers. Racism and prejudice experienced by the community featured centrally in discussions, and incited impassioned and even angry responses from some research participants. The trajectories of this discrimination were traced to sources “external” to the Somali community in broader Canadian society, as well as those that are “internal,” related to the prejudices of the Muslim community toward Somali “blackness” and/or “Africanness.” This has potentially significant negative implications for countering radicalization in the Somali-Canadian community.

### **Demographic Snapshot: The Somali-Canadian Community**

Canada hosts one of the largest Somali diaspora communities in the world. While Somali migration to Canada began in the mid-1970s, the first (and main) immigration wave occurred in the late 1980s to early 1990s as a result of the outbreak of civil conflict in Somalia (Berns-McGowan 2013, 6). In recent years, however, there has been a modest trend of Somali Canadians returning to Somalia due to the improved security environment (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015).

According to the 2011 census,<sup>29</sup> the overall population of Somalis in Canada is 44,995 (21,330 male and 23,665 female). Somali-Canadians are primarily situated in Ontario, particularly in the Ottawa (20.3%) and Toronto (47.7%) areas. Calgary (3.3%) and Edmonton have also seen increases in their Somali populations in recent years. The Rexdale neighbourhood of Toronto hosts one of the largest Somali communities in the country. The average age of the Somali-Canadian population is 24.5 years, younger than the overall average of the Canadian population (39.1 years). Roughly 59% of the population are under the age of 25 and 71% are under the age of 45 (versus 57% for all Canadians). The median income for the community was \$17,715 in 2010, significantly lower than the \$29,878 for the country as a whole.

The Somali community has been particularly hard hit by the problem of youth radicalization. By late 2013, 20 Somali Canadians had been recruited by al-Shabaab to fight in Somalia (Bell 2013b). In 2009 alone, six Somali-Canadian youth from Toronto left Canada to join al-Shabaab. Four of the six have subsequently been killed, along with Omar Hammami, another Toronto male who joined the group (ibid.). In 2011, two Somali-Canadian women from Toronto were believed to have joined al-Shabaab, representing the first known case of females being explicitly targeted for recruitment (Raveena and Teotonio 2011). Several Somalis have also joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq (CBC News 2014b; The Canadian Press 2014a). In 2014, there were reports that three men of Somali descent from Edmonton died fighting for ISIS in Syria (Dykstra 2015; Clairmont 2014). In 2009, Mohammed Abdullah Warsame, a 35 year-old Somali-Canadian, was charged with providing material support to al Qaeda, including funds, personnel and training between March 2000 and December 2003 (US Attorney's Office District of Minnesota 2009).

The Somali community faces a number of internal problems including youth gangs, drug addiction and poverty. Between 2005 and 2010, 29

Somali Canadians (aged 17-28) were murdered in Alberta in gang-related activity (Aulakh 2010), and in 2015, Somali gangs were involved in 11 shootings with rival gangs over turf for drug trafficking in Vancouver (Burgmann 2015).

*Radicalization as a “minority” issue rooted in “majority” community-wide problems*

“Radicalization, to be honest with you, is a minority issue.”<sup>30</sup> This was a comment expressed by one Somali youth in a focus group discussion as others around the table nodded their heads in agreement. Asked to clarify, the participants asserted that the Somali community in Canada has seen some of its youth go off to fight, but that this represents an exceedingly small number of Somalis.<sup>31</sup> Taking account of the conflict in Somalia, the rise of al-Shabaab, and the more recent mobilization of jihadi fighters in Syria and Iraq, there are less than 30 young men and women from the Somali community in Canada who have gone off to join the jihad (Amarasingam 2015). Moreover, research participants commented that while much attention has been devoted to Somali Canadians who leave Canada to join terrorist organizations, others have left for humanitarian reasons and to enter Somali politics or law enforcement. They have taken with them their Canadian experiences and expertise to assist in Somalia’s development and to counter radicalization.<sup>32</sup>

According to research participants, the greater and more systemic issues in the community continue to be drugs, school dropouts, poor housing, poverty, racism and disillusionment. In the words of one community leader, “I am far more concerned by the social problems that young people in our community face than radicalization and extremism.”<sup>33</sup> It was recognized that radicalization does affect the community but this is believed to be rooted in broader community-wide problems that can make youth vulnerable to radicalization and gang violence. Radicalization risks are thought to be linked more to domestic challenges that Somali youth experience in Canada than a response to conflict dynamics overseas. Research participants often attributed these challenges to disenfranchisement and a lack of opportunities for Somali youth in Canada.<sup>34</sup> These community problems do have a relationship to conflicts abroad, however, as they can factor into driving youth overseas and making them vulnerable to propaganda and messaging that capitalizes on their feelings of alienation and marginalization within Canadian society.<sup>35</sup> According to one community leader, “[if] I’m marginalized, I’m cornered...whoever shows sympathy to

me is the person that [I will think] has my interests at heart. And that's how radicalization and extremism impacts these young people."<sup>36</sup>

Feelings of Somali nationalism also appear to have driven some Somali youth to travel abroad to join the armed struggles of groups such as al-Shabaab. A community leader explained that when some young Somali men left Minneapolis in 2008, shortly after the election of President Barack Obama, the community was devastated.<sup>37</sup> What was interesting was that these Somalis were not leaving to join a global jihadist movement, but rather to become involved in a fairly narrow nationalistic cause associated with the Ethiopian military's occupation of parts of Somalia.<sup>38</sup> Many of these youth were born and raised in the West, and some had never visited Somalia—but seemed to be willing to make the ultimate commitment for a cause that they knew relatively little about. One possible explanation offered was that these youth travelled abroad as a means of finding themselves or a sense of purpose, given that in the diaspora they often feel like they have little control over the direction of their lives.<sup>39</sup> It was also suggested that groups such as al-Shabaab actively prey upon these feelings of societal disconnection and manipulate youth for their own purposes.<sup>40</sup>

### *Racism, gangs, and systemic struggles within the community*

Linkages between internal and external Somali experiences of racism and radicalization were discussed by a number of research participants.<sup>41</sup> Regarding internal racism, research participants explained that what it means to be Muslim is often deeply coloured by Middle Eastern and Arab culture. As such, leadership positions at Muslim student associations, mosques and other religious organizations are often not open to African, South Asian or Southeast Asian Muslims in Canada.<sup>42</sup> While this sentiment is rarely expressed openly, some youth did point to it as a factor in their sense of alienation from Canadian society.<sup>43</sup> Somali youth often struggle with the feeling that they do not fit entirely into the Muslim community or broader Canadian society. It is important to call attention to the pervasive feeling among Somali youth that they are discriminated against on multiple fronts. One community activist explained that Somali youth are often seen as a “triple threat”: black, Somali and Muslim.<sup>44</sup> Youth focus group participants concurred: “I think it's a combination of all three... imagine all of those put together.”<sup>45</sup>

Somali youth feel disconnected, as though they do not belong anywhere.<sup>46</sup> This “in-betweenness” extends to integrating one's Somali identity with other identities such as Muslim and Canadian. The question as to which identity takes precedence is a challenge for youth trying to come to terms with not only their own sense of self, but, more problematically, processes of external categorization and classification within Canadian

society. These processes can disempower individuals, robbing them of their ability to freely express themselves and resulting in further alienation.<sup>47</sup>

Racism and marginalization were discussed in relation to Somali youth turning increasingly to gangs and other “radical” actors in search of a sense of belonging.<sup>48</sup> The same dynamics that are believed to push youth to gangs are also thought to make them vulnerable to radicalization. For some research participants, the descent into gang life and the processes associated with radicalization are not entirely separate. Varied academic research has suggested that the ideological component often present in radicalization distinguishes it from gang recruitment, where the primary motive may be brotherhood, ego and/or economic benefit (Decker and Pyrooz 2011). However, the desperation, disillusionment and alienation experienced by some Somali youth is thought to drive them to destructive behaviours associated with both gangs and violent extremism. A community leader articulated this view: “[w]e have to find ways where we give young people pathways to want to live or else they’re going to find easy pathways to want to die. Young people going into gangs know that it’s a dead-end thing. ... I think they’re largely prepared for that because they’ve gotten to a point in their lives where the desperation has superseded any deterrent and I think radicalization is similar to that.”<sup>49</sup>

Many of the community’s problems were also described as being tied to the “refugee experience”: the shock of migration, the lack of job opportunities for the first generation, mental health challenges linked to conflict-related traumas and broken families, with frustrations and challenges trickling down to children. These issues are believed to connect to systemic concerns in the community such as gang membership.<sup>50</sup> According to one community leader, “[i]t’s all tied together...if we failed at the mental health and we failed at the poverty, you’re going to go to gangs.”<sup>51</sup> Even as the community recognizes issues affecting its youth, a recurrent theme in the interviews and focus groups was that the community is not well-equipped to deal with them. In part, this is related to the response of the Somali community to the experience of racism, which has resulted in a tendency to self-isolate and cut itself off from Canadian society.<sup>52</sup> Bolstering the community’s capacity to respond to the myriad challenges it faces was viewed as an important aspect of building community resilience to radicalization.<sup>53</sup>

Somali youth also spoke extensively about their struggles at school concerning racism and a general lack of guidance and support. One youth discussed a “racism of low expectations” exemplified by a high school guidance counsellor who declared there is “no way you’re going to college.”<sup>54</sup> Such experiences have reinforced the mindset among some Somali youth that they are never going to succeed in mainstream Canadian society. The experience of racism, not solely from teachers but throughout the school system, was seen as one of the main factors leading to dropouts. Participants in one of the Somali focus groups commented that many kids feel so frustrated by being targeted that they

eventually lash out, only to be suspended or expelled, further perpetuating feelings of failure and an inability to succeed in society.<sup>55</sup>

*Perceptions of discrimination from the Canadian government and law enforcement/ security agencies*

Strained relations between the Somali community and the Canadian government and law enforcement and security agencies featured centrally in many discussions. Some community members expressed the view that even when the Canadian government and its security establishment have sought to engage them in outreach activities, the community's perspective is often ignored.<sup>56</sup> Political rhetoric concerning Muslims during the 2015 federal election campaign was also highlighted as an example of a broader attack on Muslims that heightened levels of frustration with government.<sup>57</sup>

Somali leaders framed the community's relationship with law enforcement as historically problematic with a legacy that continues to negatively impact the community's trust in law enforcement officers.<sup>58</sup> This general wariness of the community toward law enforcement includes perceptions that the police target and profile members of the Somali community.<sup>59</sup> Although research participants did indicate that there have been some signs that this relationship is improving, most community members believe that it will take time to heal past wounds and build trust with law enforcement.<sup>60</sup>

Research participants had the sense that, too often, the police are visible in the community only when they are making arrests and that outreach initiatives have not gone far enough in engaging with the community in a "two-way" process.<sup>61</sup> The importance placed on community outreach being proactive rather than reactionary, was emphasized. Research participants called for concrete measures to facilitate better community-police cooperation. This is indicative of community feelings of "burnout" due to being "overstudied," most often with little tangible results in terms of investments in the community.<sup>62</sup>

Community leaders suggested that law enforcement officers ought to engage in a more concerted and rigorous community engagement strategy to help shift negative perceptions of the "other" and dispel stereotypes on both sides.<sup>63</sup> Existing Somali-run community programs targeting youth to provide positive alternatives to gangs, violence and/or crime, represent sources of community resilience that should be bolstered. More effective partnering with Somali community actors could help alleviate criticisms concerning the security services' lack of genuine will to engage the Somali community.<sup>64</sup>

The experience of internal and external forms of racism and negative interactions with government and law enforcement, in combination with systemic challenges related to

trauma, disillusionment and disenfranchisement, have left the Somali community with multi-faceted challenges. The depths to which these have impacted the Somali diaspora is vividly apparent in the comments of a community leader who equated the Somali community in Canada with a “failed state.”<sup>65</sup>

### The Syrian Diaspora

While there is some evidence of Syrian youth leaving Canada to join militant movements abroad, the vast majority of those interviewed did not see radicalization as a problem affecting their community. In fact, questions about whether they are concerned about radicalization were often reinterpreted as describing an existential threat to *them*, as opposed to seeing extremism as a problem within the community. In other words, groups such as ISIS were seen as being externally imposed on Syria and Syrian diasporas, where jihadi rhetoric and activity have traditionally been foreign. A corresponding theme was the distinction between violence *in* the community versus violence *against* the community. Although the community perceived there to be a low-level risk of radicalization, concerns arose about violence against the Muslim community in Canada. It was noted by several research participants that a number of Syrians have experienced varying degrees of racism and discrimination in Canada.

While many of those interviewed also discussed Sunni, Shia and Alawite splits in their community, and acknowledged that these could foster communal tensions, discussions centred more on refugees and the trauma Syrians may have suffered as a result of the war. Intra-community divides along pro- and anti-regime lines and traumas related to the conflict were central concerns identified by research participants. There were, however, positive indications of a growing sense of community social capital focused on bridging internal divides and humanitarian efforts to assist “new” arrivals to integrate into Canadian society. This social capital represents a strategic opportunity for the Canadian government to leverage toward strengthening overall community resilience, not only in the Syrian community, but across Muslim diaspora groups. The relationship between the community and the Canadian state and security agencies was described as less acrimonious than some other diaspora communities that participated in this study. A level of collaboration is ongoing regarding the crisis in Syria and the influx of refugees into Canada. Research participants were broadly hopeful about the prospects for the Syrian Canadian community under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government.

### **Demographic Snapshot: The Syrian-Canadian Community**

Syrian immigration to Canada can be divided into three periods. The first period of immigration was between 1885 and 1908, when the majority of immigrants were Christians from present-day Lebanon who fled out of fear of the renewal of the Christian-Druze conflict and military conscription. The second period occurred from 1945 to 2011, after an easing of legislative restrictions on immigration in Canada. Newcomers were more or less evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. The third period is from the start of the current civil war in 2011 to the present.<sup>66</sup> As of January 29, 2017, 40,081 refugees have arrived in Canada as a result of the current refugee crisis.<sup>67</sup>

According to the 2011 census,<sup>68</sup> the overall population of Syrians in Canada is 40,840 (20,575 male and 20,265 female), although this figure will double in the coming months with the current influx of refugees. The majority of Syrian Canadians are located in Quebec (44%), with large populations also in Ontario (39.3%), Alberta (6.5%) and BC (4.4%). Montreal is the municipality with the largest population (40.4%), followed by Toronto (19.8%). The community has tended to be widely disbursed across Canada. This can be attributed to two factors: they emanate from a “cosmopolitan trading hub” and thus integrate well with new cultures, and the surveillance and oppression experienced by Syrians under the Assad regime has made them wary of congregating with their compatriots in large numbers (Peritz and Ross 2015).

The average age of the Syrian population is 32.8 years, younger than the overall average of the Canadian population (39.1 years). Roughly 40% of the population are under the age of 25 and 69% are under the age of 45 (versus 57% for all Canadians). The median income for the community was \$22,848 in 2010, compared to \$29,878 for the country as a whole.

The recent arrival of a large proportion of the community, coupled with its lack of geographic concentration, explains in part why there have been few reported cases of radicalization in the Syrian diaspora.

*External threats to the Syrian community and imported radicalization*

A central theme that arose during the research was the view that violent extremism has been “imported” into Syria, and by consequence also imported to the Syrian diaspora in Canada. Radicalization was framed by the research participants as an external threat to the Syrian community and not representative of the Syrian diaspora or the Syrian refugees coming to Canada.<sup>69</sup> It was acknowledged that unresolved psychological trauma coupled with perceptions in some quarters of discrimination and alienation represent risk factors for radicalization, but at a very low level.<sup>70</sup> In other words, Syrian civilians have been victims of radicalism and extremism rather than a source and driver of it. According to community members, when vulnerable individuals are identified, it is often because they are seeking to isolate themselves from family and friends and/or have stopped coming to the mosque and participating in community events.<sup>71</sup>

Research participants expressed their view that extremist activities and/or behaviours in Canada are highly unlikely to involve a Syrian. Despite representing a fairly “new” diaspora in Canada, the Syrian community sees itself as relatively well integrated into Canadian society. When radicalization does occur in the community, it is believed to be rooted in disillusionment and alienation related to experiences of racism, discrimination and mental health issues stemming from the ongoing conflict.<sup>72</sup> In light of the influx of Syrian refugees in Canada, concerns have arisen regarding the possibility of radical extremists using refugee resettlement as an avenue in which to carry out terrorist attacks in Canada. Experts have indicated, however, that resettling as a refugee is the “last way” a terrorist is expected to try to enter into Canada (Logan 2015). In fact, a September 2016 Cato Institute study found that in the United States, not a single refugee admitted to the country had committed a terrorist act (Nowrasteh 2016; Levenson 2017).

Islamophobia and anti-Muslim rhetoric in Canadian society related to the conflict and ISIS were identified as drivers of alienation in the Syrian community. Some research participants expressed concerns for the safety of the Muslim community due to reports of anti-Muslim discrimination in urban centres such as Toronto, and many gave personal accounts of being targeted by Islamophobic racism.<sup>73</sup> Research participants pointed directly to the linking of Muslims and terrorism as emboldening some within Canadian society to “explicitly”<sup>74</sup> and “openly”<sup>75</sup> express anti-Muslim views. In part, such views are believed to be fuelled by negative stereotyping and imagery associated with Muslims in mainstream news outlets, social media and political discourse.<sup>76</sup> Anti-Muslim attitudes appeared to be legitimized by the rhetoric and actions of populist and right-wing political movements in the West. Canada is not immune from this trend. In 2016, the PQ leader, Jean-Francois Lisée, said the burka and niqab worn by some Muslim women are a threat to public security since the identity of the wearer is concealed from witnesses or security cameras (Macpherson 2016).<sup>77</sup>

*Inter-communal clashes and pro- and anti-regime divides*

Some research participants explained that the sectarian divisions in Syria between the Sunni, Shia and Alawite communities has also manifested itself in the Syrian diaspora in Canada.<sup>78</sup> Others adamantly downplayed the sectarian character of the divisions, noting that they tended to be political in nature, between pro-regime and anti-regime camps.<sup>79</sup>

The potential for a “clash” between the camps was articulated, which could become more pronounced with the influx of new Syrian refugees arriving in Canada.<sup>80</sup> However, the likelihood of such a “clash” leading to significant levels of violence, let alone violent extremism in Canada or abroad, was thought to be extremely low.<sup>81</sup>

Research participants noted some isolated examples of violence between pro- and anti-regime groups, primarily at protests and public rallies, but inter-group tensions are almost always dealt with non-violently. In fact, many of the Syrian Canadians consulted for the project noted that most members of the community will avoid discussing the Syrian war altogether to prevent potential conflict.<sup>82</sup> It was also expressed that the brutality of the conflict may actually be bridging divides within the community, prompting Syrian Canadians to adopt humanitarian as opposed to more overtly political forms of activism.<sup>83</sup> The community has become increasingly unified by the movement to alleviate suffering in Syria and support incoming refugees, a trend that has helped to build community social capital and bridge political divides.

*Pan-Muslim/Islamic community identity*

Notwithstanding intra-community divides, some research participants discussed the feeling that a broader pan-Muslim/Islamic sense of identity exists across large parts of the Syrian diaspora in Canada. This has potentially positive implications in that it could strengthen pan-Muslim/Islamic community social capital where divisions may currently exist (e.g., as discussed in detail by the Somali community concerning their perceived exclusion as black, African Muslims).

Conversely, this also indicates that broader Middle Eastern and/or regional conflict dynamics could influence a cross-section of Muslim diasporas in Canada and motivate some individuals to radicalize. In other words, the influence of conflicts abroad may extend beyond homelands to a broader set of conflicts affecting the wider Muslim world.<sup>84</sup> It should not be assumed that the broad existence of a pan-Muslim/Islamic sense of identity is immune to sectarian tensions and dynamics that impact the Syrian community. For example, a research participant described two violent altercations, one between a pro-Assad Lebanese individual and an anti-regime Syrian, and the other at a pro-regime rally where a youth was stabbed after raising the Syrian revolutionary flag.<sup>85</sup>

### *Intergenerational issues and divides*

Syrian youth participants suggested that the impacts of the conflict are often more pronounced for their parents and grandparents, who lived in Syria for most of their lives than for youth, although traumas are expected to be prominent cross-generationally among new refugees. Focus group participants discussed the sense of guilt they feel, however, in grappling with multiple aspects of their identity as both Syrians and Canadians, and the associated challenge of balancing the realities of their relatively safe and secure lives in Canada with ongoing horrors in Syria.<sup>86</sup> A youth focus group member explained: “you’ll sit down and say I have a bed I can sit on; a blanket I can wrap myself in if I get cold. And these people don’t do anything wrong and they don’t have these blessings...What can I do to give them the blessings that I have?”<sup>87</sup>

Intergenerational divides also exist with respect to perceptions among youth that they are being blocked from taking on leadership roles in the community.<sup>88</sup> Across the focus groups, youth participants described experiencing ageism in the community and being limited in the roles that they are permitted to play in organizing community initiatives and events.<sup>89</sup> Some youth attributed this to an innate fear of change on the part of older generations and a desire to maintain traditional practices in the diaspora.<sup>90</sup>

### *Relationship to the Canadian state and security agencies*

Prior to the recent influx of refugees, the relationship between the Syrian diaspora and the Canadian government was somewhat limited. However, the tone of the research participants toward this relationship, and anticipated closer ties in the future, was one of guarded optimism.<sup>91</sup> Youth spoke with enthusiasm about the attitude that the Canadian government has adopted toward the plight of Syrian refugees. The government’s role in sponsoring refugees and in conducting outreach with the Syrian community was viewed favourably.<sup>92</sup>

Although the majority of research participants were cautiously optimistic about the prospects for Syrian Canadians under the Trudeau government, a degree of skepticism was expressed regarding whether the change in government was likely to bring about a correspondingly significant change in policy toward the Assad regime.<sup>93</sup> For example, one community leader communicated the expectation that, despite both Assad and ISIS being detrimental to Syrian peace and stability, the Canadian government will likely adopt policies that favour the preservation of the regime due to the overwhelming focus on the threat of terrorism in Canada and abroad.<sup>94</sup>

The relationship between community members and law enforcement and security agencies in Canada was described as more tense than relations with the Canadian

government. Research participants noted that individuals in the community appear to get on the radar of the police for seemingly little reason, which fosters mistrust.<sup>95</sup> A Syrian youth explained that they might be identified by police as a person of interest due to some of their outreach-related activities with youth at risk of radicalization.<sup>96</sup> The community's lack of trust in the police is partly an outgrowth of its experience in Syria, where corruption, torture and abuse perpetrated by the security forces was rife.<sup>97</sup> This demonstrates the importance of sensitizing newly arrived Syrians about the roles of the police and justice system in a democratic society like Canada.

### *Community resilience and social capital*

Syrians in Canada represent a fairly new community of immigrants and refugees. Much like the Tamil community in the 1980s and the Afghan community in the late 1990s and 2000s, a significant amount of their activism is currently focused on issues of (re) settlement. As diaspora communities settle, and atrocities continue in their home countries, there is often a movement toward more organized and overt political activism. In the Syrian community, an organized presence along these lines has yet to coalesce. One research participant noted that a certain amount of this “quietist” political outlook is itself due to experiences in Syria, where the Assad regime brutally cracked down on activism.<sup>98</sup> In Canada, these communities require support to develop the confidence and freedom to engage in meaningful activism.<sup>99</sup>

Many community leaders and youth who participated in this research were highly aware and attuned to political events taking place both in Canada and Syria. From a community social capital standpoint, the Syrian community is making strides in creating community networks to support the influx of Syrian refugees into Canada and treat conflict-related traumas.<sup>100</sup> These efforts may help the Syrian diaspora to avoid some of the pitfalls related to untreated psychological traumas experienced by other diaspora communities (e.g., mental health challenges and/or intensified feelings of isolation and alienation in Canada).

Community leaders and youth spoke positively about the strong sense of community that exists in the Syrian diaspora, which acts as a deterrent to radicalization due to the sense of belonging it instills in community members. The Syrian community in Windsor, in particular, was mentioned as an example of a close-knit community that is believed to be achieving good results in building community resilience.<sup>101</sup> The importance of the community in the transition process of new migrants featured centrally in the remarks of the community members interviewed. Research participants stressed the significance of cultural and religious familiarity and shared bonds that can be readily drawn upon to provide culturally appropriate and familiar forms of support.<sup>102</sup> Youth also saw themselves playing a role in supporting traumatized youth in the community.<sup>103</sup> They emphasized the

importance of investing in them as one aspect of strengthening resilience to radicalization, highlighting that they have often been involved in community initiatives that seek to engage vulnerable youth in the community.<sup>104</sup>

The role of mosques and Islamic community centres were further underscored as vital spaces that not only bring Syrians together, but can also pull people back into the community if they appear to be distancing themselves.<sup>105</sup> Launching youth programs, organizing impromptu sports matches or video-game tournaments and holding events such as potlucks were cited as examples of outreach tools that the community has employed to engage vulnerable and isolated individuals.<sup>106</sup> Through such activities, the community can work to build greater community unity and resilience.

### **The Tamil Diaspora**

The members of the Tamil-Canadian community who participated in this research described the issue of radicalization as a problem of the past. In part, this is because of the defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the engine of Tamil nationalism and extremism in the Tamil diaspora. After the fall of the LTTE and the struggle to realize a sovereign state, “radical” elements in the Tamil diaspora began to fade from view. Shifts in the form and character of Tamil activism were also driven by community introspection on what forms of activism did and did not work in the past. Since 2009, the focus of the Tamil community has moved toward preserving and promoting Tamil culture and using more formal political avenues, such as the election of Tamil citizens to political office, to achieve change. Particularly influential in triggering this shift were the Tamil political mobilizations throughout 2009 in response to the end stages of the civil war, viewed by many as a watershed moment for Tamil activism in Canada.

As forms of radicalization have decreased over time, community resilience has appeared to increase. This is a product of the growing affluence of the community, its gradual integration into Canadian society and a strengthening of community social capital. The growth in community social capital is evidenced by a rise in culturally nuanced civil society organizations that are playing roles in challenging traditional and conservative stigmas that continue to persist in the diaspora. Community social capital can also be seen in the renewed prominence of cultural centres, festivals and spaces that allow for positive and more cohesive expressions of the Tamil voice from within the diaspora. This is not to say that intra-communal tensions and community conflicts that have historically plagued the Tamil diaspora have disappeared completely. Nor does it mean that violence and gang activity, specifically among youth, do not continue to present challenges to community resilience. Rather, this violence is less related to radicalization associated with the conflict in Sri Lanka and more so to the challenges inherent in the legacy of the immigrant

experience in Canada. Any strategies to address issues of radicalization must consider the immigrant experience, notions of belonging and identity, and youth alienation. Given the evolution of the Tamil diaspora over the past decade and the gradual withering of political radicalism within the community, it provides an instructive case to understand the role of different diaspora community dynamics in both permitting radicalization and fostering resilience.

#### **Demographic Snapshot: The Tamil-Canadian Community**

The outbreak of civil war in Sri Lanka in 1983 led to a wave of Tamil migration to Canada, most as asylum-seekers, that would see Canada's Tamil community become the largest in the world outside Sri Lanka (Amarasingam 2013, 5). The Tamil population is approximately 200,000 (English 2009) strong, 75% of which is located in the GTA, with a large concentration in Scarborough. There are also significant Tamil communities in Montreal and Vancouver. The average age of the Sri Lankan-Canadian population,<sup>107</sup> the majority of which are Tamil, is 32.9 years, younger than the overall average of the Canadian population (39.1 years). Roughly 39% of the Sri Lankan population—which is not disaggregated by ethnicity in the census data and thus includes the comparatively smaller Sinhalese community—are under the age of 25 and 69% are under the age of 45 (versus 57% for all Canadians). The median income for the community was \$20,598 in 2010, lower than the \$29,878 for the country as a whole.

During the Sri Lankan civil war from 1983 to 2009, the separatist LTTE—categorized by the Canadian government as a terrorist organization—enjoyed a significant base of support in the Tamil community in Canada. The LTTE was active in fundraising for its cause in Canada<sup>108</sup>; according to one estimate in 2004, the group was receiving US\$2 million monthly in funds from the Canadian diaspora (Becker 2004). There were also cases of young extremist Tamil Canadians seeking to provide other forms of material support to the group, including the provision of illicit weapons.<sup>109</sup> Support for the LTTE also translated into inter-communal tensions, with reports that LTTE supporters were responsible for the arson of Buddhist temples attended by Sinhalese worshippers (Parent and Ellis 2011).

Inter-Tamil gang violence has also posed a significant problem: there was an active war in the 1990s in the GTA between the rival Tamil gangs,

the AK Kannan and VVT. Despite fears that gang violence would escalate after the end of the civil war, it has actually subsided in recent years.

### *2009 as a watershed moment in Tamil diaspora activism*

The end of the war in Sri Lanka represented a watershed moment for Tamil activism in Canada, inaugurating a period of decreased radicalization and strengthened resilience within the community. The gravity of this moment and the shift it would trigger can be understood by examining the heightened forms of activism that took place in 2009, marked by mass rallies and protests.<sup>110</sup> It was a tipping point for Tamil activism. This is not to say that the Tamil community has not remained engaged in the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Following the end of the war, the Tamil community has sought to engage the international community on issues of justice related to war crimes committed in the final stages of the conflict and has supported efforts to rebuild war-torn regions in the north and east of Sri Lanka.<sup>111</sup>

Youth activism in particular was strongly influenced by the events surrounding the end of the war. At first, the bombing of Tamil civilians and militants by the Sri Lankan government inspired many to become involved in protests and rallies.<sup>112</sup> Tamil youth explained, however, that this engagement has not led them to adopt radical forms of activism, but instead has driven them to become more active in mainstream politics.<sup>113</sup>

Research participants framed the radical forms of activism associated with violence at protests and the financing of the LTTE as being unique to the time and space in which they occurred. The likelihood of large-scale political violence re-emerging, the participants stressed, was very low. One community leader made this clear when he stated, “so now the people don’t radicalize, they are, just as I am, trying to understand this a whole lot better. ... And to be honest I think in many ways the whole militant violence tangent of the Tamil movement is very unique in that time and space. I don’t think Tamils are violent, certainly not the Sri Lankan Tamils.”<sup>114</sup>

During the war, fundraising in support of the LTTE’s militant activities in Sri Lanka and the collection of remittances from the diaspora by pro-LTTE community members were prominent forms of “radical” activities. Coercion and extortion were evident, although many Tamil Canadians willingly contributed to the LTTE cause. In 2005, the Tamil community in Toronto was targeted by a LTTE fundraising campaign, which sought \$2,500-\$5,000 from each household (Human Rights Watch 2006). Concerns over financing of the LTTE also resulted in several police investigations that culminated in a number of Tamil NGOs in Canada losing their charitable status, especially after the LTTE was

declared a terrorist organization by the Government of Canada in 2006. For example, in 2010 Canada revoked the charitable status of the Tamil Refugee Aid Society of Ottawa, citing financial support to the LTTE (Parent and Ellis 2011). Beyond financial remittances, there is also evidence that members of the Tamil Canadian diaspora were involved in drug and arms trafficking to support the LTTE cause in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora in Montreal was believed to be involved in heroin trafficking in 1991 (The Mackenzie Institute 1995). Piratheepan Nadarajah, a Canadian from Brampton, Ontario, was convicted in 2014 on charges of providing material support to the LTTE, having conspired to buy and export US\$1 million of high-powered weapons and military equipment for the LTTE in 2006 (The Canadian Press 2014b).

*Beyond the collapse of the LTTE: shifting priorities, growing affluence, and increased integration as aspects of resilience*

The loss of the Tamil diaspora's political focal point—the struggle in Sri Lanka to realize a sovereign Tamil state—has, over time, resulted in a decrease in direct activism. It has also driven a corresponding decrease in the power of radical or divisive voices within the Tamil diaspora. The attention of the Tamil community has shifted toward family issues (e.g., livelihoods, children's education, etc.) and cultural activities, rather than politicized forms of activism.<sup>115</sup> Some community leaders also expressed the view that the growing affluence of the community has solidified this shift of priorities. The fact that the Tamil community has thrived, and become something of a success story of integration, has triggered new thinking on how to effectively leverage the Tamil voice in order to advance Tamil causes within Canadian society.<sup>116</sup> For young Tamils, involvement in Tamil issues and organizations revolves more around cultural forms of socializing and belonging as opposed to overt political activism.<sup>117</sup>

There is a sense in the Tamil community that not only have more extreme forms of political activism decreased significantly since 2009, but community resilience has correspondingly grown. The focus of many resilience-building activities has centred specifically on youth and addressing factors that are believed to contribute to youth vulnerability (e.g., gang violence, mental health concerns, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other traumas related to the past conflict). Leveraging the political power of Tamils by supporting the campaigns of community leaders running for elected office in Canada is viewed as another way to develop community resilience.<sup>118</sup>

Research participants also acknowledged that the Tamil community must accept some responsibility for its failure to widely educate Canadians about the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka and to counter the labelling of Tamil activism during the final stages of the civil war as “radical.” The relative failure to raise awareness of, or seek to shift, dominant

perceptions in the media and Canadian society are still believed to be negatively impacting the image of the Tamil diaspora in Canada.<sup>119</sup> Community members believe that there are significant lessons to be learned for the diaspora regarding activism that can play a role in increasing overall resilience within the community.

Regarding engagement with the Canadian government, a growing number of Tamils have opted to enter mainstream Canadian politics and launch NGOs as opposed to organizing demonstrations.<sup>120</sup> There are also early indications that the involvement of Tamil Canadians in electoral politics is having a positive impact on younger generations and their perspectives on the most effective ways to leverage the Tamil voice in Canada.<sup>121</sup> This can be seen in the comments of one Tamil youth: “I feel like being a Tamil Canadian is the best way to make a difference and get our voices heard.”<sup>122</sup>

### *The importance of cultural bonds and leadership*

Despite some persistent anxiety over the continued preservation of the Tamil identity in the absence of a Tamil homeland, the strength of cultural ties is seen as pivotal to community resilience. The growing prevalence of cultural as opposed to political organizations is emblematic of the shift that has taken place within the community. These organizations provide spaces for the community to engage and interact with one another outside of strictly political movements, enabling the preservation of Tamil culture and ethnic identity in more diverse ways. A Tamil focus group participant argued that involvement in cultural activities satisfied their desire to engage in the community without resorting to political activism.<sup>123</sup>

Tamil civil society organizations have had an important impact on building community resilience through a focus on countering gang violence. Anti-gang programs have aimed to expand the horizons of youth and provide them with opportunities.<sup>124</sup> Youth outreach, such as forming dragon boat teams to participate in festivals and competitions, have played a role in breaking down the community divisions created by gang activity. For instance, rival gang members have been placed on the same dragon boat team so that they learn to work together rather than against one another.<sup>125</sup>

Today, while the focus remains on youth vulnerability to gangs and violence, community organizations have increasingly channelled their attention to one of the root causes of youth vulnerability, mental health challenges.<sup>126</sup> Programming in this area has sought to provide alternative avenues to violence for youth in dealing with their problems.<sup>127</sup> While mental health issues are not a new phenomenon in the community, the work of long-standing NGOs has meant that the capacity to recognize and address them is increasing.

*Inter- and intra-communal divisions and residual ethno-nationalist sentiment*

Some research participants pointed to the residual, though much reduced, power of historically dominant hardline Tamil political groups and associations, which served as a focal point for more radical forms of political agitation within the community. This suggests that despite progress in strengthening resilience, the legacy of intra-communal tensions between pro-LTTE and anti-LTTE voices has not disappeared altogether. Furthermore, some youth felt that while these groups attempt to reinvigorate the struggle for a sovereign homeland in Sri Lanka, they also attempted to limit “Tamil identity” in the diaspora in problematic ways. Some Tamil student associations on university campuses, for example, try to link what it means to be “Tamil” to a fairly restricted form of political activism. Individuals falling outside of these strict parameters often risk being called “sellouts” or “traitors.”<sup>128</sup>

In addition to intra-community issue, inter-communal animosity between different Sri Lankan ethno-cultural groups—Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims—has had negative impacts on Sri Lankan community cohesion and resilience as well. These tensions are reflected in the experience of one community leader who explained how he had lost Tamil friends as a result of his efforts to build greater solidarity across the Sri Lankan communities in Canada.<sup>129</sup> Inter-communal divides were described as being particularly prevalent among older generations who continue to view one another with suspicion and carry resentments related directly to the past conflict. This inter-ethnic animosity may be dissipating over time as many Tamil youth commented that they do have Sinhalese and Muslim friends, although they do not necessarily inform their parents about these relationships.<sup>130</sup>

The findings of the Tamil case suggest that community resilience can be built over time as communities become better integrated into Canadian society and their priorities correspondingly shift toward addressing issues *internal* to the community, rather than those directed and driven *externally* by the conflict and/or Tamil homeland. Moreover, challenges in the diaspora are largely seen to be related to *structural factors* that exist *within* Canada itself (e.g., poverty, disenfranchisement, drugs, gangs and racism) rather than the direct influence of overseas conflict drivers.

*The lingering influence of gangs and navigating the challenges of the immigrant experience*

The lingering influence of Tamil gangs and structural factors associated with the immigrant experience were highlighted by research participants as among the greatest challenges facing Tamil youth.<sup>131</sup> Cultural stigmas that exist around mental health issues in the community, such as post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, were stressed as a reason why youth turn to gangs. Gangs are viewed as an outlet for youth who have not received support or assistance in dealing with mental health, psychosocial and structural

challenges in their lives.<sup>132</sup> The overall influence of gangs in the community, however, was described as having diminished considerably from its apex in the 1990s.<sup>133</sup>

There were few references to gang activity as signifying the continuation of political forms of violence following the end of the war in 2009. Instead, the focus group participants explained that many Tamil youth merely see the gangs as “cool,” a source of belonging that will provide them with an “imposing” identity to be respected within the community.<sup>134</sup> Violence among Tamil youth was also discussed in relation to hyper-masculinities associated with identity formation and youth bravado.<sup>135</sup>

More often than not, research participants linked gang activities to struggles associated with the immigrant experience and the challenges of integrating into Canadian society.<sup>136</sup> Structural inequalities related to poverty and disenfranchisement were viewed as factors driving youth to gangs, however, research participants were careful to emphasize that they did not view these as a cause of radicalization.<sup>137</sup>

## **LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DIASPORA COMMUNITIES: BUILDING RESILIENCE AND CVE THROUGH PREVENTION, INTEGRATION AND EARLY INTERVENTION**

The case study section clearly demonstrated the importance of the relationship between diaspora communities and law enforcement agencies as a predictor of their resilience and concomitant vulnerability to radicalization. In all of the case study communities, the relationship with law enforcement could be characterized as mixed, exhibiting signs of both mutual suspicion and embryonic partnership. The Canadian security establishment has embarked on a number of initiatives, with varying levels of success, to address the challenge of domestic radicalization and terrorism. Building bridges with local communities is one of the central pillars of the overarching approach, as this section will demonstrate. However, salient challenges remain in translating this aspiration into tangible cooperation at the grassroots level.

The framework for Canada’s 2012 counter-terrorism strategy, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy*, consists of four elements: prevent, detect, deny and respond, with resilience running through them all (Public Safety Canada 2015). On the law enforcement side, the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) have primary investigative and enforcement responsibility for offences involving national security to reduce the risk of terrorism within and beyond Canada’s borders. The INSETs are comprised of representatives of the RCMP, federal partners and agencies such as the Canada Border Services Agency, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

(CSIS), and provincial and municipal police services. INSET offices exist in Edmonton, Calgary, Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal. INSET's mandate is to: (1) increase the capacity to collect, share and analyze intelligence among partners, with respect to targets (individuals) that are threats to national security; (2) to create an enhanced enforcement capacity to bring such targets to justice; and (3) to enhance partner agencies' collective ability to combat national security threats and meet specific mandate responsibilities (RCMP 2014a).

### **Community Outreach, National Security and CVE**

Rooted in the tenets of community policing, community outreach as a part of a national security strategy involves developing trust and partnerships with communities affected by national security investigations. While there is a clear role for law enforcement in CVE, community outreach is premised on the idea that police action alone is unlikely to be effective. Increasingly, counter-radicalization programming involves an integrated law enforcement approach wherein both police and communities see themselves playing a role in preventing terrorism. Evidence suggests that individuals may be more susceptible to interventions aimed at de-radicalization if they can be undertaken early on in the radicalization process with an emphasis on the “pre-criminal” space (Robertson 2015). It is within this context that the community hub<sup>138</sup> approach has gained traction, combining the expertise of multiple agencies and individuals to prevent crime through early interventions.<sup>139</sup> The growing emphasis on prevention, integration and early intervention as a national security strategy reflects the new and evolving challenges facing security agencies engaged in CVE. These include: Canadians travelling overseas to participate in conflicts they may have no direct connection to, the difficulty of predicting and identifying those at risk of radicalization, lone-wolf terrorism, and the role of social media and the Internet in revolutionizing extremist recruitment.

### **Law Enforcement Perspectives on the Impacts of Conflicts Abroad**

Law enforcement officers engaged in this research viewed conflicts abroad and the Canadian government's responses to them as one of many catalysts for violent extremism and radicalization, rather than a direct cause. Feelings of injustice and/or resentment generated by conflicts affecting the homelands of diaspora groups have served as one driver of radicalization.<sup>140</sup> Some law enforcement officers attribute this less to Canada's role in a specific conflict; rather, they see it as a reflection of broader anti-Western sentiment, with Canada functioning as a symbol for disillusionment with Western values, beliefs and practices.<sup>141</sup>

The emergence of foreign fighters in Canada, who may or may not have an ancestral, cultural, ethnic, or national connection to the conflict they enter, is a challenging new phenomenon.<sup>142</sup> Law enforcement officers were unambiguous in stating their view that the influence of conflicts abroad is not determined solely by the connection of the diaspora communities to a homeland, but is more broadly ideological. This has become especially acute since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.<sup>143</sup> High-risk travellers (HRTs), the designation given to individuals deemed at risk of travelling abroad to join armed groups, are increasing in numbers, with the sharpest increase in HRTs to Iraq and Syria.<sup>144</sup> Michel Coulombe, Director of CSIS, testified to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence that from January to April 2015, there was a 50 percent increase in the number of Canadians who left for Iraq and Syria (The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 2016). By November 2016, these numbers, according to CSIS, had “settled down” and “levelled off” (Bronskill 2016) but were still widely seen to pose a threat. The relative newness of this trend, combined with the fact that the Syrian conflict cuts across ethnic and cultural lines impacting a cross-section of individuals under the broad umbrella of Islam, presents unique challenges for security officials.<sup>145</sup> The absence of a high degree of predictability associated with HRTs has meant that security actors are struggling to “catch up” and find ways of “monitoring, tracking and dealing with them.”<sup>146</sup>

Radicalization also appears to emerge and express itself in unique ways across different conflicts, posing varied challenges for law enforcement. Ideological radicalization, which has become increasingly prominent, differs significantly from the political, monetary or egoistic motivations of ethno-national radicalization or gang activity. This presents immense difficulties for law enforcement, who must not only enforce the law, but also disrupt the radicalization process. As one officer stated, “we’re not fighting a crime, we’re fighting an idea.”<sup>147</sup> Individuals do not necessarily consider their acts criminal, and often do not care if they are caught.<sup>148</sup> It is not the act itself that is important, but rather fighting for the cause.<sup>149</sup> This worldview makes the threat of punishment problematic as a deterrent. While ethno-national radicalization is relatively unlikely to result in deliberate violence against Canadians, the targets of ideological radicalization are diffuse and unpredictable. These relate to an assault on beliefs, ideas and values in which civilians are far more likely to be the targets of violence.<sup>150</sup>

From a national security standpoint, there is a need to be attuned to the types of conflicts occurring abroad and their potential roles as drivers of radicalization in Canada. Law enforcement officials consulted for this study emphasized that early detection of overseas conflict influences is critical because when it comes to ideological radicalization, it is important to disrupt the process as early as possible. Once indoctrinated, de-radicalization becomes increasingly difficult.<sup>151</sup> This includes developing nuanced understandings as to who might be at risk of radicalization based on the nature and dynamics of conflicts

abroad.

### Identifying Those at Risk of Radicalization

Paradoxically, it is incredibly difficult to construct a full picture of the attributes and circumstances that make someone vulnerable to violent extremism. There is “no one terror profile,” “checklist,” or “blueprint” for identifying individuals who are at risk of becoming radicalized.<sup>152</sup> There are multiple scales and criteria checklists that individuals can be assessed against—too many to be useful to law enforcement.<sup>153</sup> The sample size of those that have been radicalized and/or committed acts of terrorism in Canada is also relatively small, making it difficult to firmly identify, track and verify trends that have been observed.

Compounding these challenges is the fact that security officers need to develop mechanisms not only to identify radicalized individuals, but also to determine who might employ violence.<sup>154</sup> It is not illegal to hold radical views, so in determining how to allocate scarce resources officers must determine who is most likely to act on those views in a violent fashion. This is all the more important in an operational environment where resources are stretched and officers are overextended by large caseloads.<sup>155</sup>

The emergence of the lone-wolf terrorist presents further challenges in identifying and predicting when and where terrorist attacks are likely to occur.<sup>156</sup> Disrupting a lone-wolf attack is difficult as they operate largely at the fringes of society, whether by choice or because of ostracism from communities because of strange or unusual behaviours.<sup>157</sup> The diversity of profiles exhibited by these actors is immense, ranging from university students and medical doctors to heroin dealers and radicalized pimps.<sup>158</sup> This has made the process of day-to-day intelligence and street knowledge gathered through community policing and outreach all the more important.<sup>159</sup>

As recently as 2014, both front-line officer knowledge of how to recognize radicalization as well as training on preventing radicalization were largely absent. Significant work remains to train front-line officers, particularly in areas where INSET is not the police of jurisdiction, to support early identification and interventions to divert at-risk individuals. The national implementation of programs like the Terrorism Prevention Program is needed.<sup>160</sup> In the interim, however, some front-line municipal police are engaging in their own community outreach strategies to divert individuals at risk of radicalization. The Edmonton police, for instance, have been engaging community members through consistent forms of communication in an effort to build a common front against the problem of radicalization (Roth 2015).

Linkages between mental health challenges and lone-wolves were also raised by those

interviewed as an important piece of the puzzle. Recent evidence indicates that a significant number of lone-wolf terrorists suffer from some form of mental illness.<sup>161</sup> Using 119 very carefully developed case studies of lone-wolf terrorists, subjected to sophisticated and thorough statistical analysis, Paul Gill shows that 31 percent have a history of mental illness. This proportion is certainly higher than the incidence of mental illness in the general population; however, it runs contrary to popular perceptions, which tend to ascribe most lone-wolf behaviour to mental health disorders (Gill 2015; Gill, Horgan and Deckert 2014). Nonetheless, this points to the need for police to work more closely with actors outside of the security sphere, such as mental health professionals and other social support services, which might come into contact with these individuals.<sup>162</sup>

In the absence of reliable assessment criteria, the focus of law enforcement has shifted to analysis of the behaviours exhibited by radicalized individuals. Are there noticeable patterns that can be detected in radicalized individuals, whether in their day-to-day behaviour or in online profiles? For instance, some potential indicators of radicalization include a tendency of individuals to become withdrawn; distance themselves from friends and family; dress differently; or speak out in support of radical ideas and violent extremism. INSET officers are interested in assessing the utility of these markers and determining whether there are identifiable behavioural patterns that suggest that an individual is likely to act out violently.<sup>163</sup> They are exploring whether there are opportunities and entry points to reach out to these individuals (or their families) through community outreach initiatives such as conferences, town hall meetings, informational handbooks and/or early intervention programs.<sup>164</sup> The logic behind this was described as similar to “triaging” cases in an emergency room.<sup>165</sup> INSET officers reported seeing preliminary signs that this approach is achieving results. One specific situation was described in which a citizen who had attended a conference addressing warning signs of radicalization noticed behavioural changes in their sibling and reported them, culminating in the disruption of a planned attack.<sup>166</sup>

However, not all community outreach initiatives have been so successful. A collaborative initiative between the RCMP, Islamic Social Services Association and National Council of Canadian Muslims in Manitoba to produce a booklet intended to help stop young Canadians from being recruited by extremist groups ended with the RCMP pulling their support for the handbook just days after it was released. A statement released by the RCMP maintained that “[a]fter a final review of the handbook, the RCMP could not support the adversarial tone set by elements of the booklet and therefore directed RCMP Manitoba not to proceed with this initiative” (CBC News 2014c). Likewise, one of the Somali leaders interviewed for this study reported that community members felt “targeted” and “spoken down to” by a police officer during a conference aimed at engaging communities in identifying those at risk of radicalization.<sup>167</sup> This episode suggests that establishing preventive community engagement strategies will not be without challenges for INSET.

It is likely to be particularly difficult in diaspora communities, such as the Somali community, where a history of tense relations between the police and the community exists. In fact, two officers cited the Somali community as the most difficult diaspora community to engage in outreach or operational aspects of investigations. They attributed this to a combination of intra-community divides, anti-authority attitudes, and the insular nature of the community.<sup>168</sup>

Although there is no single profile for identifying at-risk individuals, youth have overwhelmingly been observed as a common identifiable demographic characteristic, with those aged 12-32 most at risk.<sup>169</sup> The average age of those succumbing to radicalization appears to be decreasing over time (Anzalone 2015). The susceptibility of youth to radicalization is believed to be linked to vulnerability factors associated with adolescence such as the appeal of adventurism, the desire for a sense of belonging, feelings of invincibility and acting out violently.<sup>170</sup>

There were conflicting opinions among law enforcement officers regarding whether or not a vulnerability profile for youth at greater risk of radicalization can be developed. Several common features were highlighted as standing out as potential youth vulnerability indicators:

- come from broken homes (divorced, single-parent households);
- have suffered catastrophic and/or traumatic events;
- have a history of family/domestic violence;
- have been influenced by a charismatic personality;
- have been exposed to “online” and/or personal propaganda;
- exhibit behaviours encompassing youth bravado, machismo and testosterone-driven activity;
- are first- or second-generation Canadians from specific diaspora communities, particularly Muslim; and
- exhibit disillusionment with tenets of Canadian society.

Continuing to build understanding of the ways that extremist groups convince youth to join them and the reliability of a vulnerability profile are central areas for future research.

### **Social Media and Countering Virtual Recruitment**

The proliferation of social media platforms and technologies has had a profound impact on how individuals are radicalized. Social media platforms play a vital role in enabling

groups such as ISIS to wage propaganda campaigns and target individuals vulnerable to radicalization. The radicalization process in Canada often begins virtually, with an impressionable youth being targeted and/or connecting to groups/individuals online. Once this process begins, they are “self-radicalized through the Internet” as they search for alternative narratives about Islam and/or conflicts abroad to those propagated in mainstream society.<sup>171</sup> The phenomenon of the “Google imam” was raised by an INSET officer who recounted the challenge, described to him by an imam, in reaching individuals once their religious views have been influenced online.<sup>172</sup> The imam explained that regardless of what they teach, if an individual disagrees with their interpretation, they simply search online until they find the “guidance” that reinforces their views, a form of “confirmation bias” (Dimmock 2015).

The Internet enables isolated and alienated individuals to connect with virtual communities of believers, providing the sense of belonging and purpose that was hitherto lacking. As Sageman (2008, 84) explains, the Internet makes the “leaderless jihad” possible; without it, disillusioned and angry Muslims “would scatter all over the political space without any direction.” Social media facilitates the creation of networks and lowers the bar to expose vulnerable youth to charismatic leaders and disruptive ideas that will help them “cross the line from venting their anger to becoming terrorists.”

Social media remains one of the most challenging aspects of disrupting the pathways by which vulnerable youth become radicalized. Widespread access to websites such as the now-defunct *Paladin of Jihad* (also known as the Tumblr series “#Dusty”) provides individuals with a step-by-step guide to travelling abroad to take part in conflict, including what to pack and how to avoid detection while crossing multiple borders.<sup>173</sup> The application of websites and social media technologies in virtual recruitment are constantly evolving, with at-risk individuals being coached via a variety of mediums.<sup>174</sup> No sooner does law enforcement disrupt one pathway than another emerges. It can also be difficult to predict the outcome of disruptions. For example, Martin Rouleau, who committed a terror attack in 2014 by running over two members of the Canadian Forces in a car, was known to security officials, and had his passport confiscated after attempting to leave Canada twice.<sup>175</sup>

Disrupting individual extremist cells can be achieved if a member of the cell becomes known to authorities. This can be accomplished through activities such as “scraping” social media accounts for clues about their online peer networks.<sup>176</sup> Disrupting extended networks, however, is far more challenging. As technology becomes increasingly sophisticated, messaging platforms such as Viber and WhatsApp, and more recently Snapchat and Ansa, allow users to send messages that are automatically deleted or employ encryption software that restricts external access to conversations (Bloomfield 2015). The online peer networks that security officials are able to “scrape” may not glean insights into

larger transnational extremist networks.<sup>177</sup>

INSET believes they need to be more proactive in their online community outreach strategy in order to engage individuals, their peers and families through the same medium in which they are often radicalized.<sup>178</sup> Montreal's INSET C Division's response has been to create an interactive, open-source e-book as an educational tool on radicalization. Once launched, the e-book will be available to download as a smartphone app, and will also be deployed on police computers so that front-line officers can use it in their day-to-day patrols. It will also be made available to teachers and other social service providers in schools and the broader community to help them educate others on radicalization.<sup>179</sup> C Division has also utilized internships and cooperative programs to harness the innovative ideas of students on radicalization. INSET provides them with practical work experience in exchange for their participation in discussion groups and conference-style events on topics related to national security such as social media awareness and radicalization via the Internet.<sup>180</sup>

### **Prevention and Early Intervention through the Community Hub Model**

As prevention and early intervention have garnered increased attention, the community hub model has gained prominence as an integrated approach that can be used in CVE.<sup>181</sup> Already employed in a number of jurisdictions, including Prince Albert, Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, there are plans to expand the hubs to London, Toronto and Halifax, among others. The hubs are a multi-agency process, designed to safeguard vulnerable youth before they are drawn into violent extremism. In the past, approaches to CVE have neglected to focus on the preventive measures inherent in the hub's intervention programming; they have failed to ask what is missing in the lives of vulnerable populations that makes the offer from extremist groups attractive.<sup>182</sup> The hub operates by considering the indicators and inputs of radicalization in each case. It then identifies resources and key agencies and actors that are best placed to participate in an intervention. The hub model is envisioned as a multi-faceted and flexible framework that "wraps around" the individual to provide tailored support based on their specific needs and vulnerabilities.<sup>183</sup> This includes surrounding them with a range of integrated support services from social workers, mental health professionals, employment counsellors, housing authorities, religious leaders, teachers, local NGOs, community centre workers and law enforcement.

At present, hubs are intended to target young people who are becoming radicalized, but who have not yet committed an offence or made the transition to violent extremism (Public Safety Canada 2015). Hubs need not be utilized only in instances where an individual is in the "pre-crime" space or before someone has left to join conflicts abroad.

The hub could also be effective if applied to *reintegration* efforts, particularly for those who have gone abroad to participate in armed struggles and returned to Canada.<sup>184</sup> The judicial community could look to hubs as a tool in sentencing, imposing hub interventions as a condition of release or a component of incarceration.<sup>185</sup> Early intervention and reintegration rest on the idea that community social capital plays a key role in national security, representing an effort to build on forms of community resilience to counter radicalization. However, one officer did speak to the issue of “diaspora self-interest,” where community leaders seem to want their own “face time” with police rather than presenting a united or cohesive front in their dealings with the police.<sup>186</sup> This reflects the type of police-community tensions and suspicions that could hinder implementation of the hubs at the community level.

There seems to be a clear expectation that the hubs, and other affiliated community engagement programs, will facilitate and coordinate preventive interventions. As greater trust and communication is facilitated between law enforcement and communities, the programs will promote greater flows of information not only from authorities but also to them. In this way, the hub model can support investigations. Integrated two-way community-police engagement programs have already sprung up alongside community outreach strategies. A good example is the women’s cultural yoga program in Regent Park in Toronto. The program enables INSET O Division to engage women from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds and to break down barriers as women can use the spaces provided by the program to discuss community concerns with the police.<sup>187</sup> Community outreach officers also attend local community events, slowly introducing information about national security issues. This includes a recent invitation to attend a community-led movie screening and panel discussion with the Syrian diaspora intended to promote dialogue about how the community can pull in those at risk of radicalization rather than ostracize them.<sup>188</sup> Junior Police Academies (JPAs), day-long programs in which children are introduced to different aspects of police training, have been held in a number of cities to educate diaspora communities about the police and their role in the community. The JPAs help to build trust with children in communities where there might traditionally be animosity toward the police and to dispel negative stereotypes, while showcasing policing and emergency services as desirable career choices.<sup>189</sup> These programs could be used to build trust and educate new migrants from conflict-affected regions, such as the recent influx of Syrians, about the role of the police in Canada.<sup>190</sup>

Prevention/engagement and investigation/enforcement are viewed by those supportive of the hub model as two sides of the same coin in safeguarding Canada’s national security.<sup>191</sup> An emphasis on one side over the other will result in an imbalance that is unlikely to lead to success in CVE. Greater communication across the pillars of prevention/engagement and investigation/enforcement is needed to ensure that all are streamlined and moving in the same direction, with a clear understanding and awareness of each other’s roles.

Prevention/engagement offers a constructive and cost-effective deterrent for those at risk of radicalization.<sup>192</sup> As a result, it can eliminate the need for more traditional law enforcement mechanisms such as investigations. When an individual crosses the threshold to terrorism-related activities, the police take action to “detect” and “deny” through investigations and enforcement.<sup>193</sup>

Importantly, INSET does not see law enforcement as leading the hub initiative but rather as having a seat at the table.<sup>194</sup> This stems from community warnings that the hubs could lose credibility if law enforcement is seen to be in the lead. Instead, one idea that several INSET officers have suggested is to appoint a community leader or someone working in a support service role in the community to coordinate each hub.<sup>195</sup> By assigning leadership of the hubs to individuals outside law enforcement it is thought that some of the barriers to police interaction with communities can be avoided. Currently, when an individual at potential risk of radicalization is reported to the police, the police are put in a position whereby they are obliged to respond, often by launching an investigation into the person’s activities. This puts the person reporting the risk in an awkward position, as perceived informants could face retribution if they are seen to be “snitching” on their communities.<sup>196</sup> The process could potentially be made easier and more effective if the hub coordinator took reports of suspicious behaviour from community members or if this responsibility could be shared among all hub participants.<sup>197</sup> This would assist the police in directing investigative resources to where they are needed most. It would also enable police officers involved in prevention/engagement to be brought into a hub intervention when deemed necessary based on the risk indicators exhibited by the individual on the receiving end of the intervention.

This hub approach may require further refinement as it moves forward. Establishing a “risk threshold” for when it is mandatory to bring law enforcement into a hub might be considered as an option to safeguard national security interests. Developing a national training program for those nominated as hub coordinators could help promote consistency across the hubs. The law enforcement officers involved in this study were explicit in their support for the hub model. They regarded the “prevent” element as the key to the country’s CVE strategy, with robust community engagement seen to be providing the biggest returns on investment.<sup>198</sup>

## COMPARING THE DIASPORA COMMUNITY CASES

Diaspora communities have often been discussed in the scholarly literature as either

peacemakers or troublemakers (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009; Lyon and Uçarer 2001). Benedict Anderson, for example, once criticized “long-distance nationalists” for perpetuating, from the safety and comfort of their new homeland, conflict and divisiveness in the country they left behind (2006).<sup>199</sup> Long-distance nationalists, according to Anderson, do not suffer any consequences brought about by their actions. They enjoy the warm and fuzzy satisfaction of “fighting for the people back home” while experiencing virtually none of the economic, social or political backlash from the state. Needless to say, Anderson has been roundly criticized for painting diasporic nationalism and transnational activism with such broad brush strokes, and for failing to understand that individuals engage in the politics of their homeland for a variety of reasons, including the fact that their friends and family may be directly affected by the conflict. Indeed, many participants interviewed for this project are deeply committed to communities in their country of origin, but are also working closely with communities in Canada to address issues of psychological trauma, social isolation and economic dislocation.

Many scholars have noted that diasporas are an important element of contemporary global politics.<sup>200</sup> But they worry about the nature of their role. Accordingly, Hoffman et al. (2007, 1-2) argue that diaspora groups are increasingly worrisome for certain countries. The authors cite six reasons for concern: (1) there is a real fear that members of diaspora communities will launch violent attacks against host countries; (2) a lack of host-country integration may make individuals vulnerable to terrorist recruitment; (3) diaspora groups have been effective fundraisers for terrorist organizations; (4) diasporas facilitate the procurement of weapons; (5) host states provide opportunities for propaganda campaigns that are impossible in native countries; and (6) diaspora groups can effectively lobby their governments to put pressure on the government of their native country. As Purdy (2003, 2) has also noted, “most terrorism-related activities in Canada are extensions of foreign conflicts” and, as such, diaspora groups in Canada have increasingly come under the scrutiny of Canadian security agencies. However, not all forms of diaspora activity need to be looked at through a security lens, as lobbying efforts on behalf of ethnic and religious kin in one’s country of origin are largely inevitable, benign and characteristically advanced through legitimate political activism or humanitarian action (Ambrosio 2002; Saideman 2002). Indeed, as we found in our research for this project, such efforts can be important indicators of “host-country integration” as it signals that individuals and groups have internalized the norms of peaceful assembly and international human rights (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999).

It is in this largely security-related context that concepts such as “imported conflict” were first discussed. However, the concept, much like “diaspora,” continues to be riddled with definitional pitfalls. For instance, the Mosaic Institute released a study for Public Safety Canada’s Kanishka Project in 2014 entitled *The Perception and Reality of Imported Conflict in Canada*, in which it argued that while a “majority of Canadians” contend that people who

have experienced conflict carry these intercommunal tensions with them after coming to Canada, these communities “repudiate violence in Canada as a means of resolving or responding to conflict” (Monahan, Berns-McGown and Morden 2014, 9). While our research supports many of the findings of the Mosaic report, there are also some important differences—and these differences largely arise from diverging definitions of the concept of “imported conflict” itself. For example, the Mosaic Institute report set out to determine “to what extent inter-community conflict manifests itself in Canada” (ibid., 19). In other words, if the conflict in Sri Lanka is between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, and the conflict in Syria is between Sunnis and the Shia (or, more specifically, the Alawi), the project sought to discover whether the same inter-communal tensions manifest themselves in Canada. As such, *intra*-community tensions were, for the most part, absent from the Mosaic report. The definition of “conflict” taken by the Mosaic report is similarly limited to a reproduction of conflict dynamics in the home country to the host country, leaving little room for the evolution or mutation of tensions. Moreover, this report zeroes in on the issue of radicalization as a potential manifestation of influences from overseas conflict, looking at both the susceptibilities of Canadian diaspora communities to this phenomenon and their level of resilience to counteract it.

As evident from our research, the ways in which dynamics in the home country often are “imported” in Canada are varied and, of course, do not necessarily amount to security concerns. The Afghan community participants, for instance, spoke of tribal divisions as well as intergenerational splits and tensions, which have existed as long as the community has been in Canada. What is interesting is that many of the youth were deeply committed to the issues affecting Afghanistan, including Western military involvement and the civilian casualties that have resulted. Most of the activists we spoke with were involved in organizing protests, letter-writing campaigns and lobbying their members of Parliament. In their activism, they openly spoke out against Western involvement. However, there was also a general sense of conflict-fatigue amongst some youth, due to their perception of having to constantly push back against stereotypes about “Afghan women” or “backward” or “barbaric” cultural practices.<sup>201</sup> Like many of the communities we studied for this project, *intra*-community divides are also one of the main reasons for this “fatigue” and often cause youth to leave the community behind and venture out by themselves. These dynamics are also an important aspect of imported conflict that is rarely explored; namely, how different sub-groups in the broader diaspora community may create organizations, support networks, and give support to leaders based not on their merit or work in Canada, but along tribal or generational lines. These dynamics often lead youth to disengage, or to form youth networks completely outside the influence of the older generation.

Much of these dynamics were also true for the Somali community activists and youth we interviewed for the project. Just in the last few years, there have been several studies conducted within the Somali community, particularly in the Dixon area of Toronto.

Many of these youth and community leaders are, perhaps justifiably, exasperated with the frequent requests from researchers and policy analysts to recount their “problems” without having an equally vibrant conversation about programming and funding to solve them. Similarly, the issue of radicalization was not seen as a major concern for the community, at least not to the extent that journalists and researchers were paying attention to it. An oft-repeated sentiment was that no one paid attention to the community when over 70 Somali youth were killed from gang violence on the streets of Toronto; they only took notice when half a dozen youth departed to fight for al-Shabaab or ISIS. This “negative attention” has produced a lot of mistrust on the part of youth and community leaders. In a related sense, many community leaders complain that their youth need social programs, after-school activities and more robust counselling and encouragement from their teachers at school.

Participants from the Somali community expressed levels of distrust and told stories of negative interactions with law enforcement that were not present in the other communities that took part in the study. No other community lamented such an uneasy relationship between law enforcement and their youth. Recent research has shown that these issues are not entirely separate from processes of radicalization (Schanzer et al. 2016). Somali youth complained of carding, profiling and a general lack of respect shown by law enforcement. In general, this ties into a broader feeling among Somali youth and community activists that the only interaction their community has with government, media and law enforcement is through a “crisis” lens, one that depicts their community as troubled or troublesome. Many of those interviewed for the project would like the positive elements and programs in their community— organic examples of social capital and resilience—appreciated more and supported through government funding. Community participants were adamant that the issue of radicalization cannot be dealt with in isolation from broader political and social issues in the community, such as racism, social isolation, gang violence, drugs and school dropouts. Participants pointed to the need to invest in social programs in the community as a part of a holistic strategy to counter radicalization; this would include resurrecting programs that previously lost funding due to government cuts.

While many scholars emphasize the deleterious role diasporas can play in their origin and host countries, there have also been recent attempts to harness the diaspora and its resources for the purposes of peacebuilding and the promotion of human rights.<sup>202</sup> Geislerova (2007, 94, 96), for example, argues that “the involvement of diasporas in fuelling or perpetuating conflicts undermines international security and contributes to the persistence of failed and failing states,” but she is also optimistic that diasporas “can promote human rights and democratic governance in authoritarian home countries” (Geislerova 2007, 94, 96). Two themes that have been explored in the literature with respect to diasporas and peacebuilding refer to remittances, both economic and social

(Hoehne et al. 2010, 8).<sup>203</sup> Economic remittances from the Tamil diaspora community, for example, have helped family members in the country of origin feed their families, afford education and pay for expensive dowries and wedding ceremonies. Yet in most studies of the Tamil diaspora, particularly those with a security dimension, the overwhelming focus is on LTTE fundraising as a driver of conflict and terrorism in Sri Lanka. Social remittances refer to the transfer of ideas, norms, values and overall political involvement (Levitt 1998). Economic and social remittances have been highlighted in the research literature as potential avenues by which diasporas can peacefully engage with their country of origin.

One of the most fascinating examples of social remittances came from Somali community participants, who noted that while there is much attention paid in the media to Somalis who leave Canada to join terrorist organizations, perhaps more have left to help the government in Somalia. Many Somali Canadians have travelled back to enter politics and enter Somali law enforcement, using their Canadian experiences and expertise to help build a more stable Somalia. Similarly, in the Tamil community, particularly after the end of the protracted civil war in May 2009, there has been a renewed interest in helping to rebuild the war-torn north and east of Sri Lanka. As discussed in our report, the end of the war has, in a sense, dislodged the unilateral influence of the LTTE in Tamil diaspora politics, driving new and constructive debates within the community on issues ranging from caste politics to gay rights, to issues of self-determination and human rights violations committed by the Sri Lankan government during the final stages of the war (Amarasingam 2015).

### **The Importance of Community Resilience**

The notion of resilience, as commonly understood, is often limited to the individual's ability to overcome adversity, and "bounce back." This view assumes that regardless of what is happening in the broader community, resilience comes "from inside" the individual, who is able to withstand challenges and overcome them. More recent research on community resilience, however, has expanded the scope. Michael Ungar (2011, 5) argues, for example, that resilience "is both the capacity of individuals to navigate their way to the psychological, social, cultural, and physical resources that sustain their well-being, and their capacity individually and collectively to negotiate for these resources to be provided in culturally meaningful ways." This more "relational" understanding of resilience not only means that resilience looks different for different communities, but also that resilience has much to do with a community's understanding of itself, its needs and its limitations—and its ability to find ways to rectify them (ibid., 5). Each of the communities examined for this study possessed varied levels of resiliency, from very high levels in the Sri Lankan community to relatively lower levels in the Afghan community. The most effective way to make communities resistant to influences and images from conflicts

abroad, thereby preventing radicalization and containing intra-community tensions, is by strengthening community resilience. This means building the capacity of diaspora communities, in cooperation with government agencies and Canadian civil society groups, to maintain a sense of inclusion and cohesion in the community and provide vital support to at-risk or vulnerable members.

The job of policy makers in this context is a difficult one, because it not only means that there has to be increased coordination between local and national service providers, but also that these services will have to be tailored very specifically to the cultural, political and religious context of a particular community. As we saw above, different communities experience conflict abroad very differently. The factors that led to some Somali youth leaving Canada to join al-Shabaab or ISIS are very different from the factors that led the Tamil community to fundraise and lobby on behalf of the LTTE throughout the conflict in Sri Lanka. Initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism often flatten the diverse and vibrant political and cultural debates underway in diaspora communities, as is evident by our discussion above. A deeply contextual understanding is required by policy makers, law enforcement and service providers when dealing with communities and their changing dynamics. The ways in which the Tamil community interacted with events in Sri Lanka, for example, have fundamentally changed since the end of the war in 2009. The way the community sees itself, the way youth envision activism and ways of engaging the Sri Lankan government from Canada have all evolved since the end of the war. Similarly, the way in which the Syrian diaspora in Canada organizes itself has, inevitably, been affected by the war in Syria and the influx of refugees. What community resilience will mean in these contexts will also evolve and requires ongoing study and analysis.

## CONCLUSIONS

Radicalization represents a growing problem in Canada, as the rising number of Canadians who have travelled overseas to fight for ISIS and other terror groups in recent years has demonstrated. CSIS Director Michel Coulombe affirmed in February 2016 that the greatest danger to Canada is not posed by the radicalized individuals who have travelled abroad to fight, but rather those who have remained in Canada: “By talking about the number of people who are overseas, we are not thinking about people who are either prevented from travelling or have no intention of travelling but are here in Canada and are actually involved in threat-related activities” (Fife 2016). These individuals, as Coulombe stated in the opening message of CSIS’s *2013-2014 Public Report*, “come from varied social backgrounds and age groups, with a wide range of educational credentials and often appear to be fully integrated into society,” making their “detection...particularly challenging” (CSIS 2014). Many of these individuals are part of Canada’s diaspora communities, living and working among them. The research for this study has shown that the mere presence of large diaspora communities in Canada does not drive individual radicalization, as some terrorism specialists have espoused; rather, it is the tendency of individuals to isolate from broader community dynamics that makes them vulnerable to extremist discourses linked to conflicts abroad.

It is at the intersection of isolation and extremist ideology, often linked to messaging about conflicts and injustices in ethnic and sectarian homelands, where radicalization can occur. This is not to say that there are not elements of many diaspora communities that facilitate processes of radicalization and terrorist recruitment, but these are at the fringes. The best defence against these subgroups and the isolated individuals they victimize, is strengthening the resilience of diaspora communities, which, in conjunction with government bodies and security agencies, can help prevent radicalization, identify existing extremists and, where possible, rehabilitate and reintegrate them. All of the diaspora communities analyzed in this study, but particularly the Tamil case, demonstrate how robust social capital in communities can disrupt the phenomenon of radicalization as well as other anti-social activity like youth membership in criminal gangs.

The proceedings of the 2006 RAND Corporation conference on “Radicalization, Terrorism and Diasporas” described Canada’s “history of being a base or locale for many major organizations involved in homeland conflicts,” groups that “have drawn all types of support from Canada’s Diaspora communities, including attack planning and operational support” (Hoffman et al. 2007, 19). It is discourse like this, propped up in some quarters of the media, academia and political elite, that has framed diaspora communities, particularly those of the Muslim faith, as partly complicit in terrorist activity and a source of threat for host countries like Canada. It has fostered fear, suspicion and even

discrimination. Paradoxically, however, growing efforts across the West to disrupt and contain the threat of terrorism by singling out Muslim communities and even restricting their rights and freedoms, will only exacerbate the sentiments of isolation, resentment and disenfranchisement among vulnerable youth that drive radicalization. In other, words, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The diaspora as a threat thesis has tended to be accompanied by the notion that better integration of diaspora communities would neutralize their role as breeding grounds for extremism. But, as Rahimi and Graumans (2015, 49) show, “there is simply no solid and dependable basis upon which the assumption of a causal relationship between integration and radicalization can be defended.” In fact, “the assumption of a causal relationship between integration and radicalization...can have negative results on the one hand by harming the general fabric of the society and impeding official efforts for promotion of social coherence and integration, and on the other hand by undermining security strategies insofar as erroneous assumptions can lead to ineffective strategies at best” (ibid., 30). Despite the expression of concern among a minority of research participants that multiculturalism can indirectly enable the continuation of harmful traditional practices and ideas, this study showed how robust diaspora communities stitched together in Canada’s wider multicultural patchwork, reduces the space available at the intersection of isolation and extremist ideology where radicalization can flourish.

The diaspora community and law enforcement interviews conducted for this study demonstrated lingering mutual mistrust and misunderstanding. There is an awareness amongst both parties of the need for an integrated, community-level approach to counter radicalization and violent extremism. Moreover, both community and police representatives expressed growing optimism that such a grassroots, joined-up strategy can be achieved, but it has yet to fully materialize. We have seen positive experiences with community outreach by police in cities such as Montreal, Edmonton, Calgary and Hamilton, but much is left to do to establish a countrywide standard for such engagement (Fife 2016). Persistent mutual suspicions as well as uncertainty about the best strategies to engage have often stalled progress. The announcement in March 2016 that the federal government would create an Office of the Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization Coordinator may be just the step that is needed to advance and embed this community-level approach.<sup>204</sup> The office will “provide leadership, coordinate initiatives, support community outreach and foster research on radicalization to violence” (Public Safety Canada 2016b, 26). The establishment of the office demonstrates the government’s recognition that “the most effective way to prevent radicalization to violence often lies within communities.” Accordingly, as Public Safety Canada’s 2016 National Security Green Paper, explained, “A key focus for the new Office is to reach out to Canadians and build constructive relationships with communities across Canada, raise general awareness about threats and means to address them, and maintain a continual dialogue with those

communities” (Government of Canada 2016, 17). Although the activities of the office are still not clear, it is a step in the right direction.

The community-level research for this study revealed a number of trend lines that provide important insights for future anti-radicalization strategies. First, none of the communities examined perceived radicalization to be major threat, ranking it well below other community-level problems such as gang violence and systemic discrimination. Moreover, while all the research participants expressed feelings of concern and connectedness with events in their homelands, it remained secondary to community-level issues and concerns. In the Tamil case, for instance, the end of the war in 2009 drastically reduced political activism related to the Tamil independence movement, with the community shifting the bulk of its attention to charitable enterprises to support the post-war reconstruction of Tamil areas in Sri Lanka.

Second, intergenerational divisions in the diaspora communities are often sharp and have restricted political space for youth to assert community leadership roles. Government programs and law enforcement outreach strategies should actively seek to engage youth from the earliest stages of program planning through to implementation.

Third, community members identified psychosocial and socioeconomic problems, rather than influences of conflicts abroad, as the principal drivers of radicalization and sources of violent extremism. The same drivers, which often contribute to self-isolation and community dislocation, also make youth susceptible to gang membership. Accordingly, addressing a wide range of community problems, outside of the security sphere, is critical for broader anti-radicalization efforts. In other words, a holistic strategy is required to address the problem in a systematic and sustainable manner.

Fourth, the research showed that there are strong existing reservoirs of social capital and resilience in the diaspora communities that take on different forms, such as community activism, community-centric social organizations and faith-based networks. This resilience could be better tapped and leveraged through the community engagement strategies of government and law enforcement agencies.

Fifth, the communities feature significant, albeit varying, levels of distrust of government security agencies, stemming largely from perceptions of institutional racism and profiling. Despite the presence of such suspicions, community members almost universally expressed a desire to work with police to address the problem of radicalization and advocated for increased government investment in their communities. Dispelling Islamophobia and other forms of discrimination should be a centrepiece of any community engagement strategy surrounding anti-radicalization, as it has fuelled distrust of the state and wider Canadian society in Muslim diaspora communities, creating conditions conducive for radicalization.

A common facet of radicalization in Canada is some form of isolation and disconnection with the community and wider Canadian society. As the CPRLV (2016) explains, “faced with a political, social, or economic unease, either real or perceived, an individual may come to question the promise of togetherness (living together) and his or her sense of belonging to the community.” Reversing this retreat from the community by vulnerable individuals is key to anti-radicalization efforts and this is not a goal that lends itself to securitized solutions. Bhui et al. (2012) recognize the drawbacks of a security and criminal justice-centric approach to CVE, calling instead for a public health approach that considers a variety of “variables from the social and behavioral sciences such as social inclusion, exclusion, cultural identity and acculturation, stigma, discrimination, and political engagement” in engagement of vulnerable groups (ibid.).

Empowering communities to recognize early warning signs of radicalization and take steps to prevent the process from taking root, represents the most organic and sustainable approach to CVE. This requires targeted investments in communities to increase their capacity to provide adequate social and psychological support to at-risk youth. The communities themselves are best placed to provide the sense of belonging that many vulnerable individuals lack and crave. More healthy and resilient diaspora communities represent the best line of defence against violent extremism. Diasporas are not a threat, as some of the mainstream discourse on counter-terrorism has often implied, but rather Canada’s most valued asset in the fight against terrorism. In the charged contemporary political climate in the West, Canada can position its inclusive, community-driven CVE strategy as a counterpoint to the exclusionary, security-centric approach being advanced in some other Western countries. The prevailing evidence shows that this Canadian model is best positioned to deliver public order and security in a manner consistent with the country’s laws and democratic values.

## NOTES

1. A December 2015 report of the Soufan Group confirmed that “compared to the substantial increases in foreign fighters from western European countries, the flow of foreign fighters from the Americas has remained relatively stable and far lower in terms of per capita numbers” (The Soufan Group 2015, 20).
2. For another definition of resilience, see Yael, Brom and Sills (2005, 783).
3. See, for instance, Bell (2009, 41).
4. See, for instance, Abbas and Siddique (2012, 3, 8) for a discussion of these themes in the UK. Haider (2015) provides an overview of radicalization in diaspora communities.
5. As Feddes, Mann and Doosje (2013) note, mistrust of local and national authorities plays a role in the process of radicalization.
6. Emrich (2015, 5) notes that experts in the US and Europe increasingly warn against “the counterproductive effects of more repressive measures.”
7. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL1, November 12, 2015).
8. For Canada's *2011 National Household Survey*, see: <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=0&PID=106746&PRID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2013&THEME=98&VID=0&VNAMEE&VNAMEF>.
9. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL1, November 12, 2015).
10. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL2, November 22, 2015).
11. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG2-2, November 1, 2015); Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL2, November 22, 2015).
12. Focus group interview (FG1-2, October 5, 2015).
13. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL1, November 12, 2015).
14. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG1-1, October 5, 2015).
15. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL4, November 27, 2015).
16. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG2-4, November 1, 2015).
17. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG2-1, November 1, 2015).
18. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG2-5, November 1, 2015).
19. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG2-4, November 1, 2015).
20. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG2-4, November 1, 2015).
21. Focus group interview (Afghanistan FG2-3, November 1, 2015).
22. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL2, November 22, 2015).
23. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL2, November 22, 2015).
24. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL3, November 22, 2015).
25. Interviews with Afghan community leaders (Afghanistan CL1, November 12, 2015; Afghanistan CL2, November 22, 2015; Afghanistan CL3, November 22, 2015).
26. Interview with Afghan community leader (Afghanistan CL3, November 22, 2015).
27. In 2013, the Parti Québécois (PQ), a nationalist-separatist provincial political party in Quebec, proposed the Quebec Charter of Values (Bill 60), which would ban public sector employees from wearing “ostentatious” religious symbols such as the hijab and the niqab, a face covering worn by some Muslim women. See Flanigan (2014); Blatchford (2013).

28. Interviews with Afghan community leaders (Afghanistan CL3, November 22, 2015; Afghanistan CL4, November 27, 2015).
29. For Canada's 2011 National Household Survey, see: <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=0&PID=106746&PRID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2013&THEME=98&VID=0&VNAMEE&VNAMEF>
30. Focus group interview (Somalia FG2-2, January 20, 2016).
31. Focus group interview (Somalia FG2, January 20, 2016).
32. Interviews with Somali community leaders (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015; Somalia CL2, October 7, 2015).
33. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
34. Interviews with Somali community leaders (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015; Somalia CL2, October 7, 2015).
35. Focus group interview (Somalia FG1-4, November 6, 2015).
36. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
37. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
38. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
39. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
40. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
41. Interviews with Somali community leaders (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015; Somalia CL2, October 7, 2015).
42. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
43. Focus group interviews (Somalia FG1-2, November 6, 2015; Somalia FG1-3, November 6, 2015).
44. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
45. Focus group interview (Somalia FG1-3, November 6, 2015).
46. Interview with Somali community leader and focus group interview (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015; Somalia FG1-1, November 6, 2015).
47. Focus group interviews (Somalia FG1-1, November 6, 2015; Somalia FG1-2, November 6, 2015).
48. Focus group interview (Somalia FG1-2, November 6, 2015).
49. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
50. Interviews with Somali community leaders (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015; Somalia CL2, October 7, 2015).
51. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
52. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
53. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
54. Focus group interview (Somalia FG1-2, November 6, 2015).
55. Focus group interviews (Somalia FG1-1, November 6, 2015; Somalia FG1-2, November 6, 2015; Somalia FG1-3, November 6, 2015).
56. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL4, November 3, 2015).
57. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL2, October 7, 2015).
58. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
59. Interview with Somali community leader and focus group interview (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015; Somalia FG1-1, November 6, 2015).
60. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL5, November 5, 2015).

61. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
62. Interviews with Somali community leaders (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015; Somalia CL2, October 7, 2015).
63. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
64. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015; Somalia FG1-2, November 6, 2015).
65. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
66. See: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/research/syrians.asp>.
67. See: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/>.
68. For Canada's 2011 National Household Survey, see: <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=0&PID=106746&PRID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2013&THEME=98&VID=0&VNAMEE&VNAMEF>.
69. Focus group interview (Syria FG1-1, November 26, 2015).
70. Focus group interview (Syria FG1-3, November 26, 2015).
71. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015).
72. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015; Syria FG2-3, December 3, 2015).
73. Focus group interviews (Syria FG1-3, November 26, 2015; Syria FG2-2, December 3, 2015).
74. Focus group interview (Syria FG2-2, December 3, 2015).
75. Focus group interview (Syria FG2-1, December 3, 2015).
76. Focus group interviews (Syria FG2-3, December 3, 2015; Syria FG2-5, December 3, 2015).
- 77. See also Clark (2017).**
78. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015; Syria CL3, November 18, 2015).
79. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL5, January 11, 2016).
80. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015).
81. Interview with Syrian community leader and focus group interviews (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015; Syria FG2-2, December 3, 2015; Syria FG2-3, December 3, 2015).
82. Interview with Syrian community leader and focus group interviews (Syria CL2, October 30, 2015; Syria FG1-2, November 26, 2015).
83. Focus group interviews (Syria FG1-3, November 26, 2015; Syria FG1-4, November 26, 2015).
84. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015).
85. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015).
86. Focus group interviews (Syria FG2-2, December 3, 2015; Syria FG2-3, December 3, 2015; Syria FG2-5, December 3, 2015).
87. Focus group interview (Syria FG2-5, December 3, 2015).
88. Focus group interviews (Syria FG2-1, December 3, 2015; Syria FG2-5, December 3, 2015).
89. Focus group interview (Syria FG2-3, December 3, 2015).
90. Focus group interview (Syria FG2-2, December 3, 2015).
91. Interviews with Syrian community leaders (Syria CL4, November 20, 2015; Syria CL5, January 11, 2016).
92. Focus group interview (Syria FG1-1, November 26, 2015).
93. Interviews with Syrian community leaders (Syria CL3, November 18, 2015; Syria CL4, November 20, 2015).
94. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015).

95. Focus group interview (Syria FG2-1, December 3, 2015).
96. Focus group interview (Syria FG2-1, December 3, 2015).
97. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL1, October 30, 2015).
98. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL3, November 18, 2015).
99. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL3, November 18, 2015).
100. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL2, October 30, 2015).
101. Interview with Syrian community leader and focus group interview (Syria CL3, November 18, 2015; Syria FG2, December 3, 2015).
102. Focus group interviews (Syria FG1-2, November 26, 2015; Syria FG1-3, November 26, 2015).
103. Focus group interview (Syria FG1-2, November 26, 2015).
104. Focus group interviews (Syria FG1, November 26, 2015; FG-2).
105. Focus group interviews (Syria FG2-3, December 3, 2015; Syria FG2-5, December 3, 2015).
106. Interview with Syrian community leader (Syria CL3, November 18, 2015; Syria FG2-5, December 3, 2015).
107. The Sri Lanka census statistics are not disaggregated on the basis of ethnicity.
108. See Matas (2010); CBC News (2010).
109. See The Toronto Star (2009; Bell (2013)).
110. Interviews with Tamil community leaders (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015; Tamil CL2, November 19, 2015; Tamil CL4, November 26, 2015).
111. Interviews with Tamil community leaders (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015; Tamil CL2, November 19, 2015).
112. Focus group interview (Tamil FG2-3, September 6, 2015).
113. Focus group interviews (Tamil FG 2-1, September 6, 2015; Tamil FG2-2, September 6, 2015; Tamil FG2-4, September 6, 2015).
114. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL2, November 19, 2015).
115. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
116. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
117. Interviews with Tamil community leaders (Tamil CL3, November 23, 2015; Tamil CL4, November 26, 2015).
118. Interviews with Tamil community leaders (Tamil CL3, November 23, 2015; Tamil CL4, November 26, 2015).
119. Focus group interview (Tamil FG2-1, September 6, 2015).
120. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL4, November 26, 2015).
121. Focus group interview (Tamil FG 2-1; FG 2-2, September 6, 2015).
122. Focus group interview (Tamil FG2-4, September 6, 2015).
123. Focus group interview (Tamil FG2-1, September 6, 2015).
124. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
125. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
126. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
127. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
128. Focus group interviews (Tamil FG2-2, September 6, 2015; Tamil FG2-4, September 6, 2015).
129. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL2, November 19, 2015).

130. Focus group interview (Tamil FG1-2, September 2, 2015).
131. Interviews with Tamil community leaders (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015; Tamil CL4, November 26, 2015).
132. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
133. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL5, January 4, 2016).
134. Focus group interviews (Tamil FG1-2, September 2, 2015; Tamil FG2-4, September 6, 2015).
135. Focus group interview (Tamil FG1-1, September 2, 2015; Tamil CL1, October 1, 2015).
136. Focus group interview (Tamil FG1-2, September 2, 2015; Tamil FG1-3, September 2, 2015; Tamil FG1-4, September 2, 2015).
137. Interview with Tamil community leader (Tamil CL4, November 26, 2015).
138. The community hub model has its roots in the United Kingdom's early intervention strategy known as Prevent and the Channel Programme. For information on the strategy, see United Kingdom, n.d.
139. For an overview of the hub model in the context of preventative policing, see McFee and Taylor (2014).
140. It should be noted that there were nuanced differences in the views expressed across the provinces. In Quebec, INSET officers working in Montreal's C Division explained that the domestic socio-political context, and perceived heightened racism toward, and politicization of, diaspora communities plays a strong role in radicalization. The challenges in Quebec were framed as more closely mirroring those of France than the rest of Canada.
141. Law enforcement interviews (Police 3, November 4, 2015; Police 7, November 5, 2015).
142. Law enforcement interviews (Police 11, November 6, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015). Michel Coulombe, director of CSIS, told the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence on March 7, 2016 that 180 Canadians have gone abroad to engage in terrorist activities, and this includes up to 100 who have travelled to Turkey, Syria or Iraq. He went on to report that CSIS is aware of 60 that have returned to Canada (The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 2016).
143. Law enforcement interview (Police 7, November 5, 2015).
144. Law enforcement interview (Police 8, November 5, 2015).
145. Law enforcement interview (Police 6, November 4, 2015).
146. Law enforcement interview (Police 3, November 4, 2015).
147. Law enforcement interview (Police 10, November 6, 2015).
148. Law enforcement interviews (Police 12, December 10, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015).
149. Law enforcement interview (Police 4, November 4, 2015).
150. Law enforcement interview (Police 4, November 4, 2015).
151. Law enforcement interviews (Police 1, September 29, 2015; Police 7, November 5, 2015; Police 12, December 10, 2015).
152. Law enforcement interviews (Police 3, November 4, 2015; Police 8, November 5, 2015). The case of Quebec is again unique in that there appears to be an identifiable set of characteristics that INSET officers have encountered. These include a focus on second-generation Canadians, Muslims primarily from the Maghreb region (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya), and youth born and raised in Quebec. Law enforcement interview (Police 9, November 5, 2015).
153. Law enforcement interview (Police 2, October 22, 2015). For various risk factor scales, see Pressman (2009).
154. Law enforcement interview (Police 11, November 6, 2015).
155. Law enforcement interviews (Police 2, October 22, 2015; Police 4, November 4, 2015; Police 5, November 4, 2015; Police 6, November 4, 2015).

156. Law enforcement interview (Police 7, November 5, 2015). For more information, see Rushowy (2016).
157. Law enforcement interviews (Police 4, November 4, 2015; Police 7, November 5, 2015).
158. Law enforcement interview (Police 7, November 5, 2015).
159. Law enforcement interviews (Police 6, November 4, 2015; Police 7, November 5, 2015).
160. Law enforcement interview (Police 8, November 5, 2015).
161. Law enforcement interviews (Police 6, November 4, 2015; Police 13, December 10, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015). See also Seifert (2015); McCauley, Moskalenko and Van Son (2013).
162. Law enforcement interview (Police 7, November 5, 2015).
163. Law enforcement interview (Police 8, November 5, 2015).
164. Law enforcement interviews (Police 8, November 5, 2015; Police 12, December 10, 2015). See also Public Safety Canada (2015).
165. Law enforcement interview (Police 8, November 5, 2015).
166. Law enforcement interview (Police 10, November 6, 2015).
167. Interview with Somali community leader (Somalia CL1, September 28, 2015).
168. Law enforcement interviews (Police 4, November 4, 2015; Police 12, December 10, 2015).
169. Law enforcement interviews (Police 8, November 5, 2015; Police 9, November 5, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015).
170. Law enforcement interviews (Police 3, November 4, 2015; Police 4, November 4, 2015; Police 8, November 5, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015). These observations were not intended to suggest that factors associated with adolescence possess causal value necessarily, but that, in addition to numerous other combinations of potential indicators and risk factors, they might help explain why youth in particular seem vulnerable to radicalization.
171. Law enforcement interview (Police 1, September 29, 2015).
172. Law enforcement interview (Police 1, September 29, 2015).
173. Created by English-speaking jihadi, Abu Hud, the website has been described as a “Lonely Planet-like” instructional guide for foreign fighters aspiring to join up with ISIS abroad. See Kredo (2014); Reitman (2015). officers involved in this study). 12, December 10, 2015 is rable tionally be animosity the community exist. In fact, had been rel
174. Law enforcement interviews (Police 1, September 29, 2015; Police 9, November 5, 2015; Police 10, November 6, 2015).
175. Law enforcement interview (Police 10, November 6, 2015). See also CBC News (2014d).
176. Law enforcement interview (Police 4, November 4, 2015). See Townsend (2015).
177. Law enforcement interviews (Police 1, September 29, 2015; Police 4, November 4, 2015).
178. Law enforcement interview (Police 1, September 29, 2015).
179. Law enforcement interview (Police 11, November 6, 2015). It is anticipated that the e-book will be officially launched in April-May 2016. Law enforcement interview (Police 11, November 6, 2015).
180. Law enforcement interview (Police 9, November 5, 2015).
181. Law enforcement interview (Police 11, November 6, 2015).
182. Law enforcement interview (Police 8, November 5, 2015). See also Public Safety Canada (2015).
183. Law enforcement interviews (Police 13, December 10, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015)
184. For a critique of the previous Canadian government’s early intervention prevention strategy, see Robertson (2015).
185. Law enforcement interview (Police 7, November 5, 2015).
186. Law enforcement interview (Police 1, September 29, 2015).

187. Law enforcement interview (Police 14, December 21, 2015). See also <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/secur/insets-eisn-eng.htm>.
188. Law enforcement interview (Police 13, December 10, 2015).
189. Law enforcement interviews (Police 9, November 5, 2015; Police 12, December 10, 2015). See also RCMP (2014b).
190. Law enforcement interviews (Police 3, November 4, 2015; Police 12, December 10, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015).
191. Law enforcement interview (Police 13, December 10, 2015).
192. Law enforcement interview (Police 12, December 10, 2015).
193. Public Safety Canada (2015).
194. In Quebec, the police are viewed as playing more of a facilitator role than a participant one in the hubs, with participation being highly varied and including governmental, non-governmental and victim services organizations. Law enforcement interview (Police 9, November 5 2015).
195. Law enforcement interviews (Police 3, November 4, 2015; Police 7, November 5, 2015; Police 8, November 5, 2015; Police 13, December 10, 2015).
196. Law enforcement interviews (Police 1, September 29, 2015; Police 13, December 10, 2015). See, for instance, CBC News (2014e).
197. Law enforcement interviews (Police 3, November 4, 2015; Police 8, November 5, 2015; Police 12, December 10, 2015; Police 14, December 21, 2015).
198. Law enforcement interviews (Police 3, November 4, 2015; Police 8, November 5, 2015; Police 13, December 10, 2015; Police 12, December 10, 2015).
199. See also Geislerova (2007).
200. See, for instance, Weinar (2010); Koinova (2010); Adamson and Demetriou (2007); and Sheffer (2003).
201. In 2014, Canada's Citizenship Minister Chris Alexander introduced legislation entitled the "Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act," citing the two cases of "honour killings" perpetrated by Afghan immigrants. See Consiglio (2013) and Tripp (2011).
202. See, for instance, Hoehne et al. (2010); Cochrane, Baser and Swain (2009).
203. See also Swain and Phan (2012); Henry and Mohan (2003); Shain and Sherman (2001).
204. The office will initially receive seed funding starting at \$3 million in 2016-2017, with the federal budget providing another \$35 million over five years to the new office. See Butler (2016).

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